Differential Social Power

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A) A Brief History of the Theory of the Three Forms of Power

At any time, existing human potential for activity is limited so that each choice forecloses other choices, and choices thus compete with one another. Because each expenditure of energy creates conditions impinging on the potential for other choices, human activity is not only limited but also self-shaping and mutually shaping. Worlds can be imagined\(^1\) in which no person could have power over any other, and in those worlds, presumably each of us would act in our own way upon our own perceptions. In a world of inexhaustible plenty and personal vitality, where the plucked fruit were instantaneously replaced by another, and the tired and old were refreshed and made young, there would be no need to compete for resources and no possibility of excluding others from them, so no decision procedure for distributing resources could arise, and hence no economic hierarchy. In a world where all beings were immortal, or were incapable of injury but died only at a predetermined time, or were intangible or for some reason could not be located in space, or in a world where one’s condition could not depend on any injury one can suffer at the hands of another, no decision procedure for the use of force could arise, and hence no political hierarchy. In a world where beings were not conscious of each other, or could not assess each other, or where the assessments could have no impact on one or on one’s own self-assessment, in a world without praise or blame, without communal rewards and punishments, no decision procedure for offering esteem could arise, and therefore no social hierarchy. In a world that lacked all three\(^3\) sorts of human vulnerabilities, the capacity to exploit them, the anticipation

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\(^1\) The island provides the *locus classicus* for the imagination of worlds without oppression. Isla Mas a Tierra, off Chile, where Alexander Selkirk was stranded from 1704 to 1709, became the scene for Defoe’s *Robinson Crusoe*. Defoe idealized the position of the middle class; Crusoe’s father advises him to “seek” a “middle station in life,” as though that were a free choice in a world of social goods without social powers, and that form of perception of power pervades the book. Crusoe’s island appears to have no oppression until Friday arrives to offer “assistance,” an image of colonial slavery made benign because Crusoe has rescued him, has him for his sole personal relationship, is united with him against “savages,” and offers him the technology of Europe. But Crusoe’s island even before the advent of Friday and “savages,” Selkirk’s world, still bore the results of oppression and mastery; Selkirk had been raised in the Scottish middle class, and Crusoe salvaged a huge array of British goods. The experience of feral children is more to the point; they are entirely freed of human oppression, and pay the price of lacking all benefits of social power, and means of mediating it, such as speech, and so suffer natural power alloyed only by the protection of wolves or foxes. (See Charles Maclean, *The Wolf Children*, (London: Penguin, 1977.) Once a second person is introduced, social power appears: Crusoe colonizes Friday’s world. *The Tempest* comes as close as possible to eliminating it. There the image of humanity is split into Prospero, Ariel, and Caliban; Prospero represents compensatory power as a pure good, that is, as magic, the ability to produce plenty without exploitation, Ariel conditioned power etherialized, as inspiration, without the desire to humiliate or reject, and Caliban condign power made benign because he cannot control the other two. The incompatibility of even these pure forms, however, is indicated by Caliban’s continuous frustration, Prospero’s need of magic, and Ariel’s insubstantiality. On other islands, like Swift’s, More’s, and Bacon’s, as societies become larger and more complex, hybrid forms proliferate.

\(^2\) In this way of attempting to eliminate these three classes of vulnerabilities, note that for the second *incapacity* for violence against persons is easier to imagine than invulnerability to any possible violence. Absolute incapacity for violence, however, implies absolute incapacity for nearly all physical motion and control of physical motion. See note 40, page 25. The most basic issue of condign power arises from this fact, as does the basic incompatibility of condign and conditioned power, and the less basic incompatibility of condign and compensatory power. Condign power is perfected when one united group has all force and another none, but this condition limits the possibilities for productivity of the disempowered group and make it impossible for it to be genuine in offering esteem. The kinds of worlds and societies in which powers can be maximized and vulnerabilities minimized also conflict.

\(^3\) Many ways of imagining the removal of all three classes of vulnerabilities are not, as Leibniz’s term puts it, “compossible”: the possibility of one excludes the possibility of another. This probably accounts for the variety of descriptions of paradises, heavens, and utopias. Because our sufferings and incapacities are of different classes, imagining their removal produces inconsistent results. This inconsistency is a reflection of the fact that that there is an actual basis in the human condition for the partial separateness of the three
of their exploitation, and the consequent consciousness of potentials for gain and loss we each know each of us has, each of us would act of our own unhindered and unconditioned volition, arising spontaneously from our own passions, and grounded in our own authentic perceptions without fear of deprivation, violence, or contempt. In such a world we would be as free as we can imagine it could be possible to be.

But we are vulnerable, so this maximal kind of freedom, imaginable, but impossible for us, we traditionally attribute to gods. Yet imagining it, besides taunting us with all that we lose in adapting ourselves to the continuous threats of loss, retaliation, and humiliation, gives us a key to understanding our relationships with each other as they are embodied and ritualized in our economic, political, and social hierarchies.

What we seek is always some condition closer to the paradises we imagine, however foolishly, and so the world we collectively create is the concatenated result of our efforts, both as individuals and as

classes of human action that create the three hierarchies of differential power. It is their partial separateness that makes human orders unstable and open to change.

4 Multiple gods are easier to imagine than a single god because the classes of vulnerabilities and capabilities are most readily understood as multiple and non-compossible. If gods are constructions of a fusion of negations of our vulnerabilities with idealizations of our capabilities, and if these actually are non-compossible, then a single god can only be created by classing some capabilities as negative and perhaps also some vulnerabilities as positive. Consequently monotheism is accompanied by belief in a devil composed of the residual capabilities and invulnerabilities. When the remainders of the construction of the god appear inconsistent or non-compossible, the result is belief in separate demons. Belief in a devil or demons is less significant in polytheistic cultures because contrary powers can be attributed to individual gods, that is, they have the power to bestow or to deny a benefit, or, if offended, to punish with the contrary of the benefit. Gods’ negative capacities can obviate the explanatory need for demons. Medieval Christian theology’s extreme abstraction ascribed all qualities, no qualities, or qualities ‘beyond imagination’ to a single god in order to escape the problem of non-composibility, but only made it worse, for as the deity went from being partially imaginable to unimaginable but partially conceivable to inconceivable, the obvious final step was impossibility, whereas the same sequence had not affected the notion of the devil, whose imaginability had been less tampered with because the effort to totalize god had precluded an effort to totalize him except, sometimes, negatively, as pure non-Being. The final irrationality of the will to imagine that everything desirable exists, and therefore, tacitly, must be compossible, was thus that Being and existence had to be “understood” as contraries, a tacit confession of disbelief. The ironic result was that if Being and existence were contraries, the non-Being of the devil was then insufficient to make him not exist, so one gets an inconceivable all-embracing god somehow unable or unwilling to embrace a concrete and vivid devil. The maintenance of belief then demanded that god was unwilling, not unable, to embrace the devil, which had to be accounted for by the sheer repugnance of the devil, which made him more vivid, as he needed to be to frighten people away from the ‘temptation’ to disbelieve created by god’s unimaginability. Gargoyles give testimony that Medieval monotheism never existed; the idea that it did depend on an accounting device for spiritual beliefs.

5 Doctors, primarily concerned with life-threatening illness and injury, have long inquired into what appears to them as the irrationality of people’s choices to present themselves as patients. In The Body in Question, Jonathan Miller, a British physician and philosopher, has analyzed the conditions of becoming a patient. He argues that we essentially have three scales for our own perception of our maladies, one for inconvenience, one for danger (of which pain is the main but erratic indicator), and one for embarrassment, and offer ourselves for treatment on the basis of the combined total. Consequently most of us can ignore quite dangerous illness so long as the pain is not severe until it becomes either inconvenient or embarrassing also, but can present ourselves because of an embarrassing rash that is neither dangerous nor inconvenient. Consequently doctors and patients usually negotiate in some way, many patients trying to persuade the doctor to take issues relating to inconvenience and embarrassment seriously while the doctor tries to make the patient attend to issues of life-threatening illness that is not yet painful.

Inconvenience, danger, and embarrassment are related to the vulnerabilities on which society is based: the natural insufficiency and danger that the economic system manages, the interpersonal threats that the political system manages, and the possibility of social isolation that the social system manages. Miller studied middle class British patients. Britain now has a good infrastructure, some social security, and adequate public health measures, so the threat of insufficiency of physical provision is not perceived as a natural threat, but as a socially mediated one. Britain also has both a low rate of crimes against persons and
groups, to pursue the chimeras created by our vulnerabilities. Each paradise we imagine leaps out of the painful consciousness of what we wish we could cure ourselves of and avoid in the future. Each god is the being we imagine would live in the paradise we want, hence the one we think would have the power to guide or admit us to that paradise, or to institute it among us. Each utopia we imagine is a fusion of an imaginable paradise with some elements of reality we either believe can never be expunged or believe are somehow desirable; each uses a part of what we believe we understand of the actual cause and effect relationships in our world to make an image of a world some of us might convince ourselves could be made. As a picture of an orange, a beautiful woman, or handsome man can arouse the desire for what it pictures, an image of a heaven, a paradise, or a utopia can arouse the desire for what it purports to picture, whether the endless complexity of reality and the partially hidden laws of cause and effect can allow such a thing to exist or not, let alone produce it. Because the image can arouse the desire, and because we know that the desire for an orange can be satisfied by a tree is season or a trip to a market and a little money, we wish to believe that the desire for the utopia we imagine on the basis of our own vulnerabilities can also be satisfied. Yet as some analytical intelligence is used in constructing an image of utopia, more is used in shrewd assessment of the perceptions and desires behind it, and yet more in the ideological work of analyzing how it could be achieved, what in reality frustrates moves towards it or might be bringing something like it into existence, and even how reality itself, and our judgments regarding it, can be reinterpreted in the light of an assessment of the range from the actual to the possible. A utopia becomes related to actual motives in society only in the meager sense in which a picture of an orange may be related to the desire for one, and the impulse to obtain one. Ideologies and ethics are related to human motives, and hence actions, in far more complex ways. But ideology and ethics, while unavoidable because each of us imagines some preferable condition for society and makes judgments on that basis, and because each of us must comport ourselves in some particular way, are not themselves the immediate goals of the elaboration of the theory of power.

The basic analytical question of the theory of differential interpersonal power, as I will develop it here, is “Why do we do anything other than what we would do on the basis of our own authentic perceptions and desires?” The basic answer to the question is, “Because other people continually exert power over us in three forms, forcing each of us to accommodate ourselves by seeking some form of power ourselves, by assisting them in their uses of it, by using power ourselves, by actively avoiding others’ uses of it, or by somehow resisting uses of power.” All actions that do not arise solely from authentic perception and desire contain some concession to differential interpersonal power, and even actions that do arise from authentic sources must accommodate themselves to it by using it in some way.

Power is a response to the forces that nature exerts on us, and it accommodates itself to natural forces by using a small portion of natural force to resist other portions and implement parts of our will on others and their circumstances. The extent of natural force over us is physical (physical, chemical, and biological); our ability to resist and to use it is primarily biological, secondarily technological, and open to change. In Power: A New Social Analysis, Bertrand Russell defined power itself broadly as the ability to effect a desired result, and that definition could include power over oneself (if one understands the self in a way that assumes such a possibility exists), power in direct relation to the physical world, and non-human power (such as power in the animal world). But Russell’s entire analysis is one only of power that persons have over other persons. The definition that must be implied from his actual usage is actually closer to “the
ability of a person or group to effect the results it desires by extracting benefits from another person or group, thereby affecting the position and comportment of the other person or group. Some such definition of differential social power is the one that is used in the rest of the tradition. It is more useful than the broader definition of power per se in describing human relations in general, and thus social science, ideology, and ethics, tend to prefer it, and it is what I, too, mean by power.

When Russell announced his “New Social Analysis” in 1938, he was asserting that the analysis was new, not that the notion that there were three basic forms of social goods was new. That notion that there are three basic social goods is so common that it seems to have been the standard perception in many societies. In Western thought the notion that the goods that people seek to obtain from society can be summarized by variations on the triad of “wealth, power, and fame” goes back to the beginning of the writing of history, biography, and literature. In India the triad has long been embodied theologically in the triad of Lakshmi, Durga, and Saraswati, and in the classical description of the division of the upper castes into the Vysya, Kshatriya, and Brahmins. Plutarch uses the triad of “wealth, power, and fame” routinely, as many Renaissance and Enlightenment writers do. So the triad is ancient and may be perpetual. If the triad refers to basic social fact, unless we believe that our ancestors were unconscious, (or, sometimes, if we believe that they were conscious in a radically different way), we should expect the notion to be as traditional as it clearly is.

Russell is one of the initiators of a new tradition of analysis because the analysis begins from a new proposition that represents a paradigm shift. His basic new proposition is that the reason there are three primary social benefits is that all three are not merely desirable, but are desirable because they are means of accomplishing desired ends. They are primarily means, not goals. They come to be regarded as goals, as social goods, because they are means. This shift reveals a three-fold dynamism of social structure. As economics was revolutionized by the insight that labor is the source of wealth, and that therefore production, the expropriation of the benefits of production, and income must be examined to understand wealth and its uses, Russell was asserting that the political and social spheres shared similar dynamisms because they too are the products of activities aimed at securing means to further activities. Once social goods are regarded as means or capabilities, a new kind of analysis becomes possible.

If social goods are means, that is, forms of power, then they must have something in common as well as something that distinguishes them. What makes them share a genus is a major point of unity among at least those three basic social sciences, economics, politics (and organization theory), and sociology (and anthropology) that study them, as well as psychology, for each of us is formed by and lives in the economic, political, and social hierarchies. But if there really are three distinctly describable species of power, each with its own rules and results, then there is some sense in the general distinction between economics, politics, and sociology. In that case no one could entirely incorporate either of the other two, but none of the three could be well understood without substantial information from the others.

If it is true that the three traditional types of social goods are regarded as goods because they are powers, then the hierarchies that are created by the decision procedures by which they are obtained should be partially discrete. If the powers were not really of different types, the hierarchies would not be distinguishable. If the three types were not actually powers, but were things that had nothing in common, the hierarchies would be entirely discrete. There is good reason to believe that all three are primarily

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6 As Michel Foucault seems sometimes to have believed, and as Julian Jaynes maintains regarding the ancient Egyptians in The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind.

7 As the bearers of the tradition of German Idealism, most conspicuously Hegel and Hegelians, Neo-Kantians, Neo-Kantian anthropologists like Levy-Bruhl, Jungians, and transcendental phenomenologists clearly hold. Marx and Marxists, and post-modernists also generally hold that consciousness differs radically, but for them the significant differences have a different origin and meaning, and are open to change in different ways.

8 Amartya Sen’s terminology, which seeks to broaden and deepen analysis by incorporating features of social and political activity while keeping an economic basis for it. It can be expected that political theory can develop analogous concepts to incorporate features of economic and social activity, and that social theory can develop concepts to incorporate features of political and economic activity. But if there really are three different decision procedures for allotting social goods because there are really are three types of relationships among those goods and people, incorporation of one social science by another cannot be complete. Instead, economics, politics, and sociology can only be coherently united by examining the relationships among the three forms of power.
powers, and that they share the attributes of power, yet are separable forms of power, and so produce in any
society an overall structure that can divide into three kinds of apices but tends to have a bottom layer that
experiences the effects of all three kinds of exclusion and oppression that result from the monopolizing
absorption of benefits to those above. This does not imply that “inequality” is inevitable, but that the term
is simplistic. It implies instead that “inequality” must be examined in at least three basic dimensions and
that there are relationships among those dimensions so that movement in one is likely to require and result
in movement in the others.

Whether people are conscious of the basic social goods as forms of power is a different issue from
whether there are different basic social goods and from whether those goods are forms of power. It may be
possible for a society to make the basic social goods indistinguishable by using decision procedures for
their allotment that result in all of them going to one person or group. Imagine, for instance, a theocratic
society in which the priesthood uses coercive force ruthlessly to monopolize all labor and its resulting
wealth. Europeans, probably quite inaccurately, used to imagine ancient Egypt in this way on the basis of
the biblical perception of Egypt, which gave the slaves’ point of view. To the hereditary slave, society is
monolithic, especially if it is theocratic, for then the order of esteem organizes or is congruent with the
order of coercion under which the slave directly lives, and which organizes the expropriation of all benefits
of the slave’s labor. But the mere fact that any historical memory of this condition could survive indicates
that the social order, the order of esteem, was not in fact so monolithic. The Jews could remember their
slavery because they did not share Egyptian religion, and so did not contribute as much to the esteem of the
Egyptian theocrats as the Egyptian order demanded of them. Whatever other slaves in Egypt, particularly
those who believed in the Egyptian gods, believed about Egyptian society, has been obliterated. Their
beliefs were presumed to be identical to the beliefs of the Egyptian elite. So the ability to give enduring
evidence of a consciousness that distinguishes among goods or powers depends upon the character of one’s
society and one’s position in it. Whether or how consciousness of the difference itself depends on social
position in a particular society is a far more difficult matter for which literature and comparative
psychological analysis may offer some clues.

Consciousness of the partial separability of the three hierarchies of power is heightened when the
possibility of movement within society makes all three goals that can be sought. Such motion was always
possible whenever states were small and in intimate contact because what could not be obtained in one
order could be sought in another, and the resulting competition made each order unstable, hence open to
radical changes of fortune within it. Small changeable states thus made people acutely conscious of the
contingencies of social benefits. The Roman Empire did not eliminate this consciousness because it was
composed of units with very different social and economic orders, and local political orders were hotly
contested because Roman rule was often by naked force alien to the economic and social orders that
support the political order in stable societies. Because Rome facilitated and often required travel among
provinces with contrasting social and economic orders, and because in Rome itself political power also
could be gained by force or granted or denied by imperial whim, the literate elites of Rome were always
conscious that the three orders were at least partially separable. Plebians, who, as the Empire progressed,
were reduced to poverty, powerlessness, and degradation, came to experience their society as monolithic
oppression, and so their revolts became less frequent than they were during the Republic, when their
Tribunes still had some actual political power, and when Rome, still unable to use resources from its
provinces to overwhelm plebian uses of social power to deny economic power to the patricians, was still
small enough to experience the effects of plebian power. But slaves, because slavery had limited
heritability, and because one could fall into slavery from a wide variety of previous circumstances, were
agonizingly conscious of the contingencies of social position, that esteem or money or political connections
could lead to freedom and ascent in the hierarchies. Consequently slaves’ consciousness of the social order
shared elements of the elites’, so whenever there was sufficient community among a group of slaves for
each slave to believe that his chances were better if he risked himself with his fellows than if he resigned

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9 Frances M. Bolderreff, in Hermes to his Son Thoth, Being Joyce’s use of Giordano Bruno in Finnegans
Wake, (Woodward, Pa.: Classic Non-Fiction Library, 1968), for instance, analyzes Joyce’s and Bruno’s
interpretations of The Egyptian Book of the Dead, which points to an ancient Egyptian cultural life far
more tolerant and insightful than Christian cultures, as do Ezra Pound’s translations from Egyptian. Recent
archaeology also indicates that Egyptian social life was more open and complex than impressions derived
from pyramids, temples, and biblical sources.
himself or waited for improvement through some individual connection to money, power, or esteem, slaves could revolt.

Marx accurately understood that human society entirely depends upon the continuous use of labor to transform nature for human purposes, that economic power, which he conceived as a base, therefore has some priority over political and social power, which he conceived as a superstructure, and that many other consequences follow. The theory of the relations of the base and superstructure, however, has not achieved a coherent and consistent form. It is difficult to predict forms of political and social power from observation of economic power alone, and it is clear that political and social power can deeply affect economic power and even sacrifice at least a great part of it. The Marxist theory of consciousness, based on the perception that all previous philosophy was merely rationalization of religion, was primarily an inversion of the Hegelian theory, and while Hegel believed consciousness to be the sole motive force in historical movement, mediated by its manifestations, dialectical materialism developed a theory of class consciousness which, while fundamentally denying the Hegelian priority of consciousness, still required consciousness to be such a strong motive force that communism could not arise without it. The actual relations of consciousness and political and social power to economic power have thus remained an open issue, one even capable of challenging at times Marx’s most fundamental assertion, that labor is the basis of social structure.

Nietzsche developed the thesis that social power is the main motive force of both history and consciousness. He viewed philosophy as an expression of a will to power that operated within groups, making them seek dominance over other groups, and within individuals, making them either seek dominance over their own groups, or inverting itself to make them submit. For him, both economic and political power derived from social power, and consciousness was primarily a means of manipulating the symbols of social power to adjust relations of the individual to the group in the group struggle against other groups. For Nietzsche, power is a kind of fluid that flows through society, empowering some by drawing power from others. This conception has sources going back millennia in ideas like “manna,” the power which hierarchs and monarchs are sometimes thought to have, which is discharged if they touch the ground, and which have been projected onto nature in occult forces like “phlogiston,” the supposed fluid of heat. That notions like manna and phlogiston are fantasy does not imply that the notion that social power is somehow similar to a fluid also mere fantasy; rather, if social power is somehow similar to a fluid, that would help to explain why fantasies of fluid power so frequently arise. The tradition Nietzsche exemplified continues in the post-modernist development from structuralism; Foucault, though he once said, “All of us are Marxists,” in practice argued theses on the nature of power much closer to Nietzsche than to Marx.

Weber, like Nietzsche, put social power first in the form of status; economic power in the form of class and political power in the form of party or “power” derived from it. The primary historical disagreement between Weber and Marx was most visible in conflicting interpretations of the Industrial Revolution. Marx saw the Industrial Revolution as the technological transformation motivated by Capitalist accumulation of economic power that resulted in the formation of the proletariat, while Weber saw Capitalism as a product of the Protestant Ethic. I find Marx’s argument more detailed and plausible, but the fact that Weber could make his argument implies that the group formation of capitalists contains elements of social power Marx did not fully account for. Weber’s account of society as a whole is focused on the characterization of relatively stable types and roles in relationship to each other and not on the transformations of roles and relationships, Marx’s focal point. Weber’s tradition becomes systems theory and organization theory in the second half of the 20th Century, and the motion of power within organizations is embodied in organizational flow charts.

In some cases Marx’s observation of economic forms was also meager and his formulations tautological. “The Asian form of production” has long been used as an imaginary explanatory principle in discussion of Asian revolutions, but it is not actually an economic term describing a “base” at all. Instead it conflates economic, political, and social categories, because some theocracies have used condign power to assimilate productive processes to the forms of conditioned power, and the resulting patterns and perceptions are not obliterated by subsequent triumph of condign over conditioned power. Caste, for instance, is best conceived as the class structure of a theocracy that then mutates through feudal forms to its modern form.

I am indebted to Rohan George, student at the National Academy of Legal Studies and Research in Hyderabad, for a class paper he wrote in April, 2001, showing his penetrating insight into the notion of the flow of power originating with Nietzsche and relied upon by post-modernists and systems theorists.
Russell conceded to those in Weber’s tradition\textsuperscript{12} that the argument for the priority of social power is strong and easy to make, but he himself argued for the priority of political power, and, in so doing, disagreed with the Marxist position that economic power is primary. I believe the strongest, but not overwhelming, evidence on Russell’s side comes from observation of the behavior of the Communist Party in revolutions claimed by the Communist Party to be communist revolutions. Every “communist revolution” to date has not followed Marx’s model of a revolution by the proletariat against highly centralized mature capitalism, but has followed Lenin’s model, which in practice is closer to the basic model of the French Revolution, a revolt against power based on agrarian landownership. In successful and unsuccessful communist revolutions, in the USSR, China, Cuba, Vietnam, Cambodia, Chile, Nicaragua, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Angola, and in other African states, and also in West Bengal and Kerala, the dominant class has derived the bulk of its wealth and power from land ownership, and the primary issue in each has been land reform. The land reform itself has sometimes followed communist models rather than the main sorts of economic reform demanded in the French Revolution, and has had much greater economic sophistication than the French showed in 1789, but this is as much the result of subsequent history and of everyone’s increased awareness of capitalism as it is of communist theory. Marx himself expected communist revolutions first in Britain, then Germany, then France, Italy, and the United States; he thought communist revolutions would start where the centralization of capital and the polarization of the workers were greatest. Lenin reversed the order, radically changing the relationship between the communist ideal and its analysis of society. Yet Marx may still have been right about the basic structural dynamics of society, and only wrong about the resources of capitalism to modify the time frame. But that he was wrong about the time frame, as he clearly was, implies that social and political power do not have exactly the relationship to economic power he thought they had, and that some part of Russell’s, Nietzsche’s, and Weber’s analyses is accurate.

A broad characterization of revolutions called communist somewhat clarifies the issue. It is clear that communist revolutions have all begun with consciousness raising or indoctrination by relatively educated people among the most marginalized and oppressed. It is also clear that the revolution itself has been initiated by believers’ use of force (or, in West Bengal, Kerala, and Chile, by a combination of social and political power, strikes, and the threat of the use of force) to seize and transform the state’s monopoly of force in order to use it to transform uses of economic power. This broadly means that sometimes social power can be used successfully against economic power in order to capture political power, and that once political power is captured, the two together can organize economic power. Communist praxis has proven that this can happen.

This demonstration of social power, of the power of “doctrine”\textsuperscript{13} in some contexts, demands an explanation. All of the theories of power compete to explain it. Explanations in the Marxist and Communist traditions come from Lenin, Mao, Trotsky, Gramsci, Lukacs, Sartre, Castro, Althusser, Thompson, Williams, and Cohen, (and many others) each of whom have disagreements on significant points regarding the meanings of past, present, and future social relations. Ex-Communists tend to share concepts with Russell and Popper\textsuperscript{14}, and numerous capitalist political theorists, most of whom claim objectivity and detachment, and tend to argue that property is necessary to freedom\textsuperscript{15} and comes to be protected by free choice\textsuperscript{16}, or focus on the fact that economic relations are politically defined by codes of entitlement, or argue with Nietzsche and post-modernists that the social construction of social reality is more significant than human dependency on nature, and so share some of the Hegelian priority given to consciousness, which Marx rejected but then tacitly reinstated.

All search for better structural concepts, for better analytical tools, as well as for a better overall theory. My own position is that all advances so far have been made by steps in escaping reification. I see no

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{12} Weber defines “power”: “In general, we understand by “power” the chance of a man or a number of men to realize their own will in a social action even against the resistance of others who are participating in the action.” Max Weber, Economy and Society, vol. 2, Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich, eds., (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968/1978) chapter IX, p. 926.

\textsuperscript{13} Russell’s term. Galbraith’s analysis of conditioned power is a great improvement.


\textsuperscript{15} Richard Perle, Property and Freedom, (New York: Random House, 1999.)

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real advances in well-known texts between Aristotle and Rousseau, and I don’t find Rousseau’s explicit positions an advance. But his questions and perceptions are. Until 1755 differential social powers had been almost uniformly regarded primarily as social goods. Rousseau challenged the idea that they were goods, and thus began the open perception of them as powers. Rousseau was an advance because, by perceiving what had been classed as goods as powers instead, he raised the questions that Anarchists on the one hand and Marx on the other sought to answer. The Anarchists began the project of regarding the goods of politics and the supposed goods of religion, as the results of the powers of command and deception. Marx carried through the project involved in regarding economic goods as labor power and all other goods as resulting from command over it. Marx seems to have been reluctant to consider social and political power as active forces because this, for him, would have represented a return to the Hegelian belief that spirit was an active force. Though keenly aware of political goods as powers, Marx was not so sharply aware of social goods in that way, and tended to reify them in the notion of the superstructure, which used a materialistic model designed to replace Hegel, who had ultimately identified action with spirit rather than with interaction among agentic situated people. Engels reinforced that reification, extending it from the perception of social powers as goods backwards to the perception of political powers as goods. Nietzsche and the post-modernists took on the project of regarding the realm of social goods, which in Marx are the superstructure, as social power, but both neglect economics, and the post-modernists also neglect political power because they neglect the role of action and decision-making, but have reverted to issues of social and psychological identity. Russell was the first to regard all three classes of social goods as powers. This was a distinct advance in the face of the cultural dominance of reification, but he tended to regard economic, political, and social action as belonging to separable spheres, which were themselves reified, and he thought of power egoistically, on the model of uses of force, most germane to the political sphere. The post-modernists, focusing almost entirely on the cultural and social spheres, lose sight of the fact that the world has actual labor, exchanges, command, and obedience, in short, effective actions benefiting some people and injuring others, and that the benefited desire the benefits and the injured seek to avoid the injuries.

Gerrard Winstanley, co-founder in 1649 of the Diggers and their main theorist and publicist, made serious advances presumably known to Hobbes but ignored, and obviously known to Locke, but not credited to Winstanley, probably because Locke feared association with Diggers, and Levellers. Winstanley’s ideas formed the core of Locke’s labor theory of value later taken up by Adam Smith, but shunted aside and not further analyzed until Marx. Winstanley’s ideas probably had a long oral history preceding them, going back through the Levellers, then the Anabaptists, then the uprising in Munster, Germany, then Thomas Muntzer, and earlier church reformers and heretics. The Middle Ages had a monastic tradition preserving economic ideas going back at least 2000 years to the Dead Sea Scrolls, and before that to the customs of Neolithic villages, and frequently suppressed as heresy; heretical writings the Church while destroyed while burning the authors. The tradition has been further obscured because in theocracies economic and political insight is expressed in theological form, as it has often been in the Indian tradition, and consequently difficult for Moderns to decipher. But there is no reason to believe that the oral tradition that expressed itself fragmentarily in Locke, Rousseau, and Smith and led to Marx was not continuous. See Kenneth Rexroth, Communalism: From its Origins to the Twentieth Century, (New York: Seabury Press, 1974), chapters 1-10, especially 7-10.

That the identities of great social thinkers can be lost to history should not be surprising when one reflects that the identities of so many great artists have been lost also. Research in linguistics and musicology shows that most or all of the great Spirituals were composed by just one person, a slave, in Mississippi between 1820 and 1840. That person was the greatest composer and lyricist in American history. Because we tolerated slavery, we Americans do not know the name of our Shakespeare. (That might disqualify us from giving cultural advice.)

Machiavelli is a partial exception, but his analysis of condign power and to some of its accoutrements in conditioned power did not generate any general theoretical move toward regarding goods as powers, only one regarding political and military power in that way, as Hobbes did. Hume is another partial exception; he began to look at wealth as power, as Smith later did. But it was Rousseau who first approached the roles of all three forms of power in the production of classes. His Romanticism was the beginning of the perception that esteem, prestige, and status, the rules by which they are attributed, and the uses to which they are put, are also instrumental, and not merely values, goods, and accomplishments. His perception of the role of conditioned power was essential in beginning to clarify the conception of class, for class is a result of conventional uses of all three forms of power.
Post-modernists see only social pressure, but conceive of it as an issue of categories, not motives, emotions, and social actions, and so in most senses represent a return to a revised sort of Hegelianism in which individuals, again, are not really agentic, and groups may be agentic but are essentially unconscious in the sole sense they prize, which is choice in alternative categorical schemes.

John Kenneth Galbraith, in his thinking about power in *The Anatomy of Power*, considers himself primarily a student of Adolf A. Berle, Jr., whose book, *The Three Faces of Power*, is a development of Russell and Weber in the direction of organization theory. Galbraith developed the theory of power over persons, bypassing the broader potential of Russell’s definition of power as the ability to achieve a desired goal, but not Russell’s book, which analyzed differential social power. Galbraith’s improvement on Russell is signified by his converting Russell’s terms of economic, political, and social power into “compensatory,” “condign,” and “conditioned” power. This is an advance against reification because Galbraith consistently analyzes group behavior as a function of all three types of power, thus breaking the envelopes in which Russell had placed them. A manager, for instance, uses compensatory power in offering a raise, condign power in calling a lawyer, and conditioned power in persuading a worker to accept a working condition. A priest uses conditioned power in a religious service, compensatory power in paying the electrician, and condign power in having a policeman stop vandalism of the church. A bureaucrat uses condign power in giving an order to a marshal, compensatory power in paying salaries, and conditioned power in persuading a constituency that the government is functioning well. It is obviously true that some individuals and organizations seek to avoid uses of some types of power and specialize in others. But it is not true that uses of power can be easily categorized by types of organizations, and the tendency, which Russell had, to do so, is a type of reification. Russell had escaped thinking of interactions in terms of things, but he had not escaped thinking of organizations as if they were things rather than related activities.

B) Forms of Oppression

The next distinct advance along the lines of Weber, Russell, Berle, and Galbraith came from Iris Marion Young’s *Justice and the Politics of Difference*, particularly the second chapter, “The Five Faces of Oppression.” The tradition before her had primarily regarded power from a supposedly objective observer’s viewpoint, but when such writers adopted the point of view of another, it was normally that of the dominant actor, not the recipient or sufferer, so their view is slanted towards perception from the top of the hierarchy. This accounts for Russell’s tendency to see the types of power as discrete; at the apices of the hierarchies, the hierarchies tend to separate because uses of one type of power can interfere with uses of other types. Russell had dealt with that kind of interference by, for instance, classifying regimes of political power into conflicting types, such as traditional power versus naked power, where traditional power was able to draw on the support of social power, but naked power had to continually attack social power to maintain itself. This classification, however, was based upon an overgeneralization and a problem of perspective. The overgeneralization was that organizations could be easily categorized by identifying a single type of power they relied on; Galbraith improved on that. Young worked on changing perspectives. She adopted primarily the point of view of the one upon whom power is exercised, and so analyzed the situation at the bottom of the power hierarchy better than Weber, Russell, Berle, and Galbraith did. Seen from the bottom, there are five types of oppression people dread and protest. People want to be freed of the patterned actions that exploit or marginalize them, that deny them the ability to make decisions and naturalize uses of violence against them, and that degrade them and alienate them from themselves through cultural imperialism.

Young is not explicit about the relationships between the five types of oppression and the earlier triads of types power and power hierarchies. The basic relationships are nevertheless clear. Exploitation and marginalization are both primarily the effects of patterned uses of compensatory power, and they work together; institutions with compensatory power can exploit people because they have exclusive property rights enabling them to marginalize those who do not or cannot obey. Institutions with condign power can disempower people by excluding them from the prerequisites of decision-making and can systematically terrorize them through the naturalization of violence. Institutions with conditioned power can use cultural imperialism to make people admire their abusive supposed superiors and hate themselves. As in Galbraith’s system, there are overlaps of the forms of power, and these overlaps are larger at the bottom of the hierarchies than at the tops. The naturalization of violence, for instance, in some places can have its most active agents in loosely organized social groups rather than in the political hierarchy; the political hierarchy needs only to turn a blind eye on their activities for violence against minorities to become the norm.
Exploitation is certainly a political as well as an economic phenomenon, for it is enforced by police and military power when the state pledges itself to support private property rights against wide social aspirations. Marginalization, though primarily a result of exclusive rights to productive property, in developed countries is managed by the state. The production of powerlessness, though primarily a political convenience for rulers, is mediated by the conditioned power of the educational system. And cultural imperialism, a function of conditioned power, clearly serves the rich and powerful. So each type of oppression reinforces the others, making them all collect at the bottom of the hierarchies, fixing individuals and groups there, and making advances against any one form of oppression alone difficult because reinforcement can be expected from the other four.

As Galbraith’s improvement on Russell was based abandoning the reification of identifying types of power with types of institutions, and inquiring more closely into the nature of actions exerting power, Young’s improvement was based on analysis of social movements, on the assumption that any oppression felt broadly and keenly enough to arouse organized protest must be the result of typical systematic uses of power by some groups against others. Her most significant finding is that although the tradition before her identifies three types of power, analysis of social movements identifies five types of oppression. The five types of oppression are experienced by groups at the hands of other groups, not simply by those at the bottoms of hierarchies of particular institutions as the sole result of actions within those institutions. This conclusion is consistent with Galbraith’s thesis that power in each institution is a particular configuration of compensatory, condign, and conditioned power partially shared by the configurations of power use in other institutions. One net effect of the sharing is that one’s position in one institution is partially determined by one’s position in others. The result of this is that, however much those at the apices of institutional hierarchies may wish to believe that their actions are governed by the rules, needs, and possibilities of the institutions, the tops and the bases of hierarchies are occupied by different groups, and the excluded tend to share characteristics and social ties with those on the bases, not those on the tops. The overall effect is that a) though each institution is based on and develops a characteristic pattern of three types of power uses, accentuating and relying upon one type, which determines the careers of individuals within it and the impact of the institution on society (Russell), b) types of power, because they are categories of action, cannot be uniquely identified with institutions (Galbraith), c) and the jointly reinforcing effect of institutional power use is five types of oppression of some social groups by others (Young).

This raises three questions: 1) “What is the relationship between the three types of power and the five faces of oppression?” 2) “If the basic analyses of three types of power and five types of oppression are correct, why are three kinds of exercises of power felt as five types of oppression?” 3) “What does it mean that the resulting experience is of broad group conflict?” The result will be a clarification of the whole. In order to accomplish it we must develop the analysis of types of actions further to answer two prior questions. The first is “What makes one form of power different from, and partially separable from another?” The answer has two parts: power uses have units, and they rely on decision procedures. The second is, “Why aren’t uses of power random, but instead collect in patterns to form hierarchies, in which actors have different positions?” To that the basic answer is that political and social power are not explicable in the sense that economic power is in the process of exchange, but not in ruling the workplace; uses of power therefore can create more power, and so the users of power tend to create hierarchies beneath themselves.

Young analyses the “politics of difference.” Some political power can be exerted from above on the agency or initiation of individuals, which institutions and groups can then respond to, but from below, group formation must come first. Young begins from an analysis of social movements. Social movements are collective action by groups responding to the collective results of differential power. The groups must be capable of organization around issues; there are identifiable sets of people suffering similar constraints who generally do not organize into groups, particularly when stigma thought to attach to individual histories makes each feel a separate source of humiliation, shame, guilt, or incapacity. The ill, the senile, the retarded, those labeled insane, the objects of scandal, the long-term unemployed, the homeless, alcoholics, and drug addicts, for instance, usually interpret the forms of social invalidation they experience as referring to themselves uniquely rather than to themselves as members of groups, and so will not organize themselves on the basis of the issues that most effect them as groups. Social movements do not protest individual actions in themselves, so the analysis of social movements does not much advance the microanalysis of power transactions. The reason that social movements can sometimes appear to protest individual actions is because individual actions can be seen as representative of types of actions that injure large numbers of the members of the group, so members can feel they are in some way advancing their own
and the group’s cause by advancing an individual’s. Members of such groups must feel that their commonality outweighs the degree of individual disqualification they feel, and the first requirement of group formation is the transcendence of individual disqualification in the creation of group identity. Beginning analysis of power with analysis of social movements leaves out of consideration some individuating disqualifications that can be more oppressive than oppressions that allow group formation. Consequently Young’s analysis can be expected to be incomplete in failing to identify all forms of felt oppression.

Sole use of Young’s analysis to analyze the types of action that create oppression would also be incomplete. The incompleteness is primarily of uses of social power, for it is social power that, even in the most open societies, first inhibits group formation; in more closed societies, political power can do so also by restricting rights of association and speech, as can some uses of economic power, such as termination of employment. So Young’s main limitation for purposes of the general analysis of power is that she considers only oppressive group effects of group power uses publicly articulated by self-forming self-representing groups. In understanding the features of power that must be considered for social change, however, Young’s analysis is crucial because, from below, only those issues can be changed that groups can form around. Society cannot be affected by any actions of individuals not already possessed of truly extraordinary differential social power, which itself can only come from prior support of large numbers of people. At the end of their lives, even Gandhi and Mao mourned their essential failures to affect their societies in any far-reaching way, and those two individuals experienced far greater support from hundreds of millions of people than any other persons in history have experienced during their lifetimes.

Reflection on two logical fallacies yields basic insight into the nature of individuals and groups. The fallacy of division is the assumption that what is true of a group as a whole is true of each member; the fallacy of composition is the assumption that what is true of any member is true of the group as a whole. These two fallacies represent a barrier between analyses of wholes and of parts analogous to the traditional division between macroeconomics and microeconomics. Yet it is clear that the meaning of the action of the whole is composed of the actions of members, that meaning of the whole is the context of individual actions, and that the meanings of individual actions are partially related to meanings attributed to and derived from meanings of the whole. But how can one get from microanalysis of actions to macroanalysis of the behavior of wholes?

First note that when the whole is considered as a hierarchy, those on the top of the hierarchy do not have the same relation to the whole as those on the bottom. Second, both the actors on the top and the bottom know this basic fact: knowledge of it is implicit in knowledge of what one’s position is. The actor nearer the top is secure in support from some number of people below, as well as potential assistance from actors closer to the top of the condign and conditioned hierarchies, and also knows that potentially antagonistic people further down know of this secure support and potential assistance. The actor nearer the bottom has a certain expectation that actions initiated nearer the top will be supported and implemented by persons further down, and further knows that other individuals near the bottom cannot individually

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If an official in the middle of the political hierarchy believes his action is ministerial, he is secure in assistance from above. If he believes his action is discretionary, he believes assistance probable. If he believes his action is ultra vires, he assumes forbearance of those above. If he believes his action corrupt, he believes his security depends on the extent of collusion and knowledge. (If collusion is limited, he believes he is at risk. But if collusion is systematic, corruption can be a covert condition of employment or promotion.) In the social hierarchy, the middle actor’s belief in potential assistance from above depends on social distance, particular shared interests, and how the middle actor perceives and believes he can represent the relationships between the higher individual, himself, and the one of lower status. Because choices in the use of compensatory power are unmediated, assistance from above works differently in the economic hierarchy. For instance, an employer may assist a middle level employee in a conflict with a person lower down, but the middle actor is not likely to expect assistance from the wealthier merely because the wealthier has more economic power. The middle actor would expect economic assistance from above on the basis of conditioned or condign relationships, that is, social relationships such as family, caste, race, religious affiliation, and political connections, and the extent of mutually shared or reciprocal, not differential economic power. If one appeals for assistance from a wealthier person against the demands of a poorer one, the wealth of the one appealed to may be reason for the choosing to appeal to that person, and may be a necessary condition for an offer of assistance, but it is not a sufficient condition, which must come from some other aspect of the relationship.
withstand the pressure of the collective effects of actions initiated from above. So the basic logical truths expressed by the fallacies of division and composition take on an active form in a hierarchy. That positions are differential, and that actors know this, together mean that statements about actors in positions can rely upon elements of the subjectivity and intersubjectivity of actors, and so have a peculiar force denied to other attempts to move from members to groups or groups to members.

For instance, the employer entirely depends on workers, but depends on them collectively, not individually. Any individual worker can be replaced. Each individual worker may know that the employer is dependent on the collectivity of workers, but this knowledge does not itself affect the individual worker’s position if the individual worker depends entirely on the employer for employment. The worker who seeks to reduce exploitation, that is, the extraction of surplus value, can be marginalized. Hence the workers appear individually to be dependent on the employer even though the employer in fact is dependent on the workers collectively. The same is true in an army, a political party, a bureaucracy. The general is entirely dependent on the obedience of subordinates. Each subordinate might know this. Yet the subordinates reasonably expect that if any of them seeks to assert any individual power, that is, to escape powerlessness, the effort will be interpreted as disobedience, the general’s orders will be carried out by others, and the disobedience will be punished by some type of officially approved violence. Consequently each subordinate feels individually dependent on the general though the general is collectively dependent on subordinates. The same is true in social occasions, in a religious service, an auditorium, a theater. If an individual starts to boo, the crowd will to see who is making the commotion, and some members will signify group disapproval or actually usher the interloper out of the room—unless the crowd believes the interloper somehow has more power than the focal performer. If, say, the crowd perceives that the one booing is the pope, the president, or John Wayne, other audience members might pick up the hue and cry. But the differential relation of members to groups remains the same: focal and other high status members, though dependent on the group as a whole, can rely on the subservience of the group because each low status member expects the collective action of the group to respond to the will of high status members. Change in this set of expectations occurs only in crisis, when a large number of subordinates have changed their allegiance, partially in the belief that the allegiance of the group as a whole is on the verge of changing, and thus is capable at that moment of revealing the actual dependency of the leader on the group. Such a crisis makes a strike, a coup, or the disruption of a social function, depending on whether it is initially directed against compensatory, condign, or conditioned power; once initiated, it may spread to resistance to other forms of power.

There are three major reasons for Young’s failure to analyze the relationship between the five faces of oppression and the three forms of power. The first is implied by the limitations of her starting point, just discussed. The second is that the basis of the types of power has not been clearly identified because it has not been shown that individual acts of differential social power are related to their social effects by different means, so that a) the “units” of power uses must be conceived differently, and b) the source of hierarchy must be found in an absent of randomness to be accounted for by the presence of general social decision procedures. The third is the influence of post-modernism, which hypostatizes social power uses as issues of categorization (“construction”) in the apparent elitist belief that only post-modernists, not actors, are capable of category choices (supposed to be only available through “deconstruction” a process believed to be too complex and too demanding of insight for actors to perform.) The result of the post-modernist focus on categorization is a failure to analyze hierarchical actions carefully, and thus a failure to see that hierarchically determined actions are based on decision procedures. If we clarify these three issues, Young’s analysis of group oppression needs only one adjustment, already alluded to three paragraphs above, to mesh with the earlier Russell-Berle-Galbraith analysis of power.

C) Definitions of Basic Terms

20 In an Indian law school, an upper caste student warned a lower caste student not to contest against him in a student election by saying: “I know what I am. You know what you are.” The lower caste student later said, “What he meant was, we both know there is nothing I can ever do in my life that can bring me the kind of clients and cases and importance everyone already knows he will have, so by contesting I would be doing nothing but making the other students forcibly impress this fact upon me.”

21 The title of Young’s chapter, “The Five Faces of Oppression,” implies that she intended to speak to this tradition, embodied in Berle’s The Three Faces of Power.
This section redefines the most basic terms of this theory of power: social power, compensatory, condign, and conditioned power, vulnerability, hierarchy, and decision procedure. The change in basic terms is not large. But it is subtle, and so must be carefully stated in the abstract so that the right sort of examples can be seen to fall into each class. Once one has dropped Russell’s assumption that forms of power can be uniquely identified with institutions and states, and has adopted Galbraith’s assumption that successful power uses are, in the long run, modulated to include elements of compensatory, condign, and conditioned power, then the identification of systems of power in which one can specify such contingencies as conditions, expectations, intentions, uses, failures, effects, the feeling of effects, counter-effects, and transfers of power from one form to another, requires careful definition. This chapter gives preliminary analysis of the elements of these definitions, which are used throughout the book to examine the structure of those contingencies and their institutionalization. The chapter concludes with a chart showing the parallelism of basic terms and some derivatives.

**Compensatory power** uses a cardinal system for the transfer of expendable equivalent units of entitlement to command labor and its products that the combined effects of condign and conditioned power allow to be commanded through transfer of equivalent units of entitlement. The composite of what other significant economic actors believe is one’s total entitlement is one’s credit.

**Condign power** uses an ordinal system for commanding actions down a hierarchy of threat. Its unit is potential command over all those in the hierarchy below the level of the agent, subject to the combined effects of constraints of compensatory and conditioned power. The institutional definition of one’s condign power is embodied in one’s official position; the composite of what political actors believe one’s institutional power is, and which is taken to suit one for a position, is a political actor’s credibility.

**Conditioned power** uses a holistic system for maintaining and altering action patterns. Its unit is the dependent apparent assent that each gives on the basis of an estimate of the reputation of actors, where the reputation of actors in turn depends on indications that the group as a whole gives assent, those indications in turn being orchestrated by the joint action of actors, and each unit of assent subject to the constraints of compensatory and condign power and to the degree individual feeling of potential influence on, independence of, or alienation from, the whole group. The composite of the apparent assent that others believe others have given constitutes one’s reputation, which can be tied to different social qualities because assent can make qualitative distinctions.22

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22 Every act of assent is both assent to an actor and to an action or expression. One may not only be known or famous, but can be known for some quality. There are thus sub-species of conditioned power, such as goodness, truthfulness, aesthetic qualities, humor, reliability, intelligence, etc. In general reputation attributes qualities to individuals, whereas credit and credibility attach to circumstance and position. Because of this qualitative character, conditioned power has sub-species in a way that compensatory and condign power do not, and is far more complex and more open to change. Compensatory and condign power can be used in different ways in different contexts; uses of condign power can be changed by law, and uses of compensatory power can be changed by law, technology, organization, and social change. But condign and compensatory power keep their species identity because their relative unitization makes their uses discrete. Money either is or is not paid; a person either is or is not within the scope of another’s command. Conditioned power is more protean. The learner of a language must accommodate the social categories required by the language. If Telugu has only pronouns signifying either superiority or inferiority, the learner cannot express equal relationships in it. If the Latin general word for virtue also signifies valor, the learner must tolerate the ambiguity. If all Japanese words for the self signify differential status, the learner must prematurely commit herself to her purported status. Negating or conditioning what is once said is not the same as not having said it. Because conditioned power is protean, it can shift into new shapes. A subspecies develops when a social group disallows a possible shift into another shape and so develops a form of conditioned power markedly separate from adjacent forms, such that acts that increase one’s power in one group decrease it in another. The general’s uses of military forms of conditioned power lower his status in a monastery. A brilliant economist may lose a public debate on economics to a skilled politician ignorant of the subject. In such cases it makes sense to identify subspecies of conditioned power.
The basic units of power are divisible entitlements, threats of graded scope\textsuperscript{23} depending on hierarchical position, and dependent apparent assent. This clarifies the species of differential social or (or differential interpersonal\textsuperscript{24}) power.

To go further we have to use these definitions to return to the clarification of the genus, differential social power itself. What must differential social power itself be, such that it has three separable varieties? Why should there be three types of differential social power? Why does the exercise of social power become differential, why does its uses result in differential personal positions that in turn change the scope of further uses? To see into the nature of power itself, so that we can answer these questions, we have to return to the simplest questions.

What is social power the power to do? It’s the power to get other people to do things that otherwise we would have to do ourselves to get them done if, acting alone, we still regarded those actions as worth our time and energy to perform, and we had the means to do them ourselves. To get another person to do something we want them to do, we have to give them some reason to do something other than what they would do spontaneously on their own. But why does anyone ever do anything other than what he or she spontaneously wants to do?

That poses the problem from the point of view of the wielder of power. Let’s reverse the point of view. Why do we ever suffer someone else to direct our actions? Why do we ever do anything that someone else wants us to do rather than doing what spontaneously occurs to us to do on our own? Why do we ever do something for someone else that the other person could not or would not do on their own if they didn’t have us to do it for them? What can ever be important enough to us for us to abandon our own desires, perceptions, and initiative in order to do that?

Obviously some of our desires arise from vulnerabilities and have to represent needs, not merely wants, and needs are linked to wants in a continuum. Some of our perceptions have to be open to influence, so that we see not only through our own eyes, but also from the perspective we attribute to others, or see what others want us to see, or see in a way that is preferable to them, or represent to ourselves or to them what we see in a way that they prefer. Our choices are only choices among alternatives we can consider and rightly or wrongly believe in some sense realizable. Our wills are open to influence also. Though the authenticity of a project implies some independence of power relationships, authentic project formation and pursuit does not imply ignorance of, insensitivity to, irrelevance to, or lack of need of some form of power. Inauthenticity signifies the ability of social power to entirely overwhelm the will’s capacity to identify itself and make itself known. Evidence of the inauthentic is the greatest inadvertent testament to our vulnerability.

Our vulnerabilities make us subject to the will of others. We all know this from earliest childhood, and as we mature, we quickly come to know that others know it is true of us, then that it is true of them, then, gradually, that they also know that we know it is true of them, and, eventually, that each one has some degree of awareness that each other knows this of others and even that each knows that each other has some awareness each other’s assessment of each other’s vulnerability and power. We come to know that these assessments are differential, that each of us can be right or wrong about them, and that the consequences of being right or wrong can change people’s lives, sometimes immediately, dramatically, and even finally.

The mutual knowledge and reciprocal estimates of differential assessments is the basis of hierarchies. It is hardest to discover the vulnerabilities of those at the top of hierarchies and the powers of those at the bottoms of them, but this difficulty is not symmetrical. Those at the tops, because as children

\textsuperscript{23} Legality of officials increases the scope of threats because subordinates believe that official actions will be backed by the force of the entire hierarchy. Illegality of officials decreases the scope of their threats to the actions of others in collusion with them.

\textsuperscript{24} I use “social power” to discuss differential power in relation to society as a whole, “interpersonal power” to discuss differential power in particular interactions. The reason for considering the terms as alternative equivalents is that social power is a composite of particular interactions, so the choice of term depends on contextual perspective. The entitlements, position, and assent one has at any time are the sedimentary results of prior interactions that have different types of transferability into different present situations. There is always the potential for interaction between individual interactions and one’s social power as a whole. This is also true of particular patterns of power uses of social groups, corporations, institutions, states, and national economies and the relative power of those wholes within their environments.
they were always further down the hierarchies, have and can act on knowledge of their own vulnerabilities. Some of those at the bottoms, never having experienced effective social power, may experience only their own vulnerability, and may be hard pressed to discover any power in themselves even when their superiors covertly dread their power. Thus the experience of vulnerability always temporally precedes and emotionally underlies the experience of power, and the grandiose who attempt to reverse this order are driven by fear to deceive themselves and others, if they can. Security itself is always tentative and relative, and depends on understanding one’s own relationships with others and their vulnerabilities and power. Seekers of safety in ignorance and incompetence are inevitably disappointed.

We must grant then these basic points about the experience of every one of us. 1) Vulnerability is our deepest experience. 2) We all feel our vulnerability both in an absolute or natural sense because of our mortality, our vulnerability to pain, sickness, and injury, and our physical limitations before the vast power of nature, and in a relative sense: we feel more vulnerable to some people than to others. 3) The relative vulnerability we feel in relation to others has different qualities. Differential social power is built on relative vulnerability of different qualities. However we judge the desirability of mastering others through social power, by controlling access to wealth, power, and esteem, we have no doubt that there is danger, injury, and death in absolute penury, in the total subjection to command of slavery, and in the total isolation experienced by those who, if they ever succeed in gaining a moment of attention, are treated with visceral disgust.

The fetishism of commodities makes compensatory power partially invisible to us; we see a world of goods, and we wonder how to get them, instead of seeing the flow of labor and transactions transforming each other and our relationships to each other, which usually only becomes visible to economists and entrepreneurs—and to bewildered and frustrated unemployed workers. Habitual conformity to the patterned behavior mandated by law makes condign power partially invisible to us; we see apparently free and normal activity punctuated by occasional exceptions, commands, and uses of force, instead of seeing a stream of continuous commands general and particular and obedience, which usually only becomes visible to political scientists, organization theorists, lawyers, politicians, and officials—and to prison inmates. Habitual understanding of customary perception, and continuously modulated display of the indicia of social value—of clothes, accent and idiom, gesture and expression—and of the subtle signs of approval and disapproval they arouse, and the fact that all of these are choices among alternatives at some time considered by the actors but not revealed, make conditioned power largely invisible to us. We see a public world of enormous variety seeming to reach in all directions, appealing to different tastes, morays, occupational norms, and religious ideals, instead of seeing the continuous flow of approval and disapproval, acceptance and exclusion, prominence and suppression, which usually only becomes visible to sociologists, anthropologists, psychologists, and creative artists—and to children trying to learn when to

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25 Theocracy, with its possibility for maximal concentration of the three power hierarchies, provides the limiting case. Outsiders to the inner realm of the ruling Buddhist order of Tibet may have believed that Dalai Lamas, from the moment of their recognition by Tibet’s theocracy, were at the top of Tibet’s compensatory, condign, and conditioned hierarchies; that was the ritual illusion the order strived to present, mostly on the basis of genuine belief. Those within the monastic elite, of course, though no less faithful, knew this not to be the case, so it is not possible that the Dalai Lama could have grown up without experiencing uses of differential power upon himself. Emperors, monarchs, and the children of the fabulously wealthy normally grow up with less solicitude and power, and subject to much greater potential threats than some theocrats may experience in childhood.

26 Buddhist theocrats receive prolonged intensive training in compassion toward all suffering, and are encouraged not to act on the basis of their own vulnerabilities, but only on their awareness of everyone’s, and all immediate conditions are contrived to reduce their own sensation of vulnerability. Monarchs, by contrast, generally are encouraged to perceive and act out of their own vulnerabilities, those capacities being regarded as the prime guarantee of political stability when sovereignty is thought to reside in an individual.

27 Many traditions ritualize this by expressing contempt in terms of shit, filth, and pollution, that which is automatically to be excreted, disposed of, hidden, buried, and excluded. Every human being is vulnerable to humiliation by this set of associations because every infant experiences the mother’s distaste, distance, rigidity, and occasional disapproval and anxiety in cleaning the infant’s feces. Reacting to a human being as if they were themselves shit is therefore the most effective single way to degrade a person to the bottom of the conditioned hierarchy. The Indian practice of untouchability uses this method, as do many traditional American and European racist practices.
raise their hands in class, to mental patients trying to figure out how to get released, and to the Scheduled Castes and Blacks trying to understand why there is nothing they can ever do make what they actually feel and think acceptable, or even visible, to the Upper Castes and Whites. Each of us, depending upon our position in society, is able to convert some of the nouns, adjectives, and adverbs of the language of social goods into the verbs of the language of social power. Mothers all know something of the struggles of their children beginning to learn first in infancy the basic rules of conditioned power, then in childhood the fundamentals of condign power, then in adolescence and adulthood, compensatory power. But much power can only operate in secrecy and invisibility; businessmen consult in board rooms, lawyers in their offices, priests in confessionals. All of us choose among alternatives most of which remain only in rapidly fading traces of unrealized and unexpressed imagination and dream, often unknown even to ourselves. We do not see each other’s dreams. We see each other’s social goods. Consequently, unless we make a profession of knowing it, and then only in some approved, partial, and marketable way, others’ effort appears primarily as possession, their frustration as lack; their vulnerability is masked lest we find ways to take advantage of it, and their power is concealed or revealed according to their purposes, not ours. The effort to resist reification’s hold on our perception makes us resort to abstraction and generality. The concrete world of particulars still covers transactions with the veil of solidity that makes the creating and ordering principles within and between each item of social life difficult to perceive.

The gods who can bestow wealth can inflict poverty; the ones who can bestow peace can inspire war; the ones who can offer wisdom can leave us in doubt and confusion. This follows from the nature of powers and vulnerabilities, not the nature of gods. Our vulnerability makes us perceive the same contrary possibilities in our relationships with other people we believe more powerful than ourselves. The vulnerability of those who feel themselves weaker than we makes them perceive the same contrary possibilities in us. We are disciples of each other, godding our supposed superiors and perhaps aspiring to be godded. We can denigrate this aspect of our relationships, or seek to downplay it; we can understand it as well as we can, and try to escape it. We can even seek to undo it: to those who think us proud, we can tell our shame, and our guilt; to those who think us wealthy we can show our empty pockets; to those who think us powerful we can narrate occasions of our helplessness. We can give up all the insignia of pride, our money and property, our official positions and capacities, and even our citizenship. Such individual acts, by symbolic means, may have some marginal effect on some people’s uses of social power; if we not only give up, but can somehow successfully transfer wealth, command, and esteem to some people with markedly less, we can in fact benefit other individuals, and sometimes groups. But we cannot escape differential social power itself. We can only change our position in the context of it, and occasionally the position of some others, usually only our families. No matter how we modify our own actions and condition, we cannot control the perceptions of others. No matter how we attempt to control others’ perceptions of ourselves, we cannot control their perceptions of others, themselves, and their relationships. No matter we attempt to control others’ perceptions of themselves—the traditional task of priests, the modern project of social workers and psychiatrists—we cannot affect it directly, and however we can affect it depends on others’ perception of us and their relationships with us. No matter how we attempt to control others’ perception of others—the precipitously growing project of the media and government—we cannot directly cause other people, say, to consider everyone equal in some sense, or to treat each other in some sense equally. There is no way to imagine that differential social power itself is in any individual’s control.

Because we know that it is not, we know much more. We know that each of us has a position relative to others. We know that others relate to us as they do partially or wholly on the basis of what they perceive to be their own position, our position, and the relationship between the two in the context of other relationships. This knowledge is ineradicable and inescapable. It is also interpersonal: we both know we both have it. We know, moreover, that other people have it, and that they must rely on their beliefs about it to get what they need and want and to avoid destitution, pain, and humiliation. We know, finally, that they will rely on these beliefs. Differential social power is thus enforced from all sides. It can be changed, but not eliminated. And it can be changed only against the persistent pressure of many people.

All of these things can be known about differential social power, and our own position and possibilities within it, without knowing exactly what it is, or what makes it take the forms it takes. This is what makes it easier to identify species of differential social power than to identify the genus. Other species might arise, but what would make them species of that genus?

When we experience our own vulnerability, it is in relation both to nature and to situated conscious social actors. What we can get from one we cannot get from others; what we can suffer at the hands of one, we need not fear from another. The judgments we make on these possibilities in the realm of
our personal lives may differ radically from the judgments we find other make. But in public life—in the market of labor and goods, in politics, bureaucracy, and the police and military, and in the major institutions of social life outside our own families—we find significant areas of agreement about persons. Outside the immediate family, social mediation becomes increasingly important in determining who we meet and what circumstances we meet them under. We choose the shop we go to on the basis of the choice the owner has made in naming the shop. We search for employers on the basis of prior information about them. We see bureaucrats on the basis of the direction of people more knowledgeable. We meet the people at parties on the basis of the host’s invitations, the people in temples, mosques, synagogues, and churches on the basis of religious affiliation, the guests at hotels on the basis of class and interest. In sum, the relative vulnerabilities and powers we experience are not random because social experience is not. When we make horizontal shifts from village to city or one country to another, and make vertical shifts from wealth to poverty or poverty to wealth, or from one level of condign power to another, or when we gain or lose esteem in a group, we begin to learn that there is a distinct difference between vertical and horizontal movement, and that knowledge of this difference is also shared. Because it is shared knowledge, we realize also that most people who desire change want horizontal and upward shifts because of widely shared assumptions about the powers available and vulnerabilities suffered in different places and positions. The obvious source of the most desire to change one’s life is the desire to decrease one’s vulnerabilities and augment one’s powers. The most conspicuous differences among people in this arise from which vulnerabilities they most dread and which powers they most desire.

So it is common knowledge that hierarchies exist and that they act on us all. Our assessment of their importance, our involvement in them, our vulnerability to influence by them, and the power we exert through them, can be matters of some degree of choice. But that does not make them subjective. Social power hierarchies may be considered objective, as most social scientists do, intersubjective, as phenomenologists do, or features of social reality if social reality is given a special sense, as Searle does. But, in whatever way they exist, why do they exist?

Let’s be simple. To say that a hierarchy of social power exists in itself says only that vulnerabilities and powers are reciprocal and that their arrangement is not random. The rest is implied by this. If the arrangement is not random, then those with more power can be said to be above those vulnerable to them, and to experience less vulnerability than those below, who have less power. There cannot be more people with relative power than those with relative vulnerability for the simple reason that, to have relative power, one must by definition have power over someone else. So the top must always be smaller than the bottom. Consequently power hierarchies can be imagined, initially at least, in triangular form.

Pick any point in a triangle. What does having a position identified by that point mean?

Having a position in a hierarchy means there is a decision procedure for making one’s choices in relation to the power that others have to make their own choices. In a compensatory hierarchy, one is entitled to choose command over labor, goods, and property so long as one offers more divisible units of entitlement than anyone else happens to offer for that choice at the same time and place. In a condign hierarchy, actors at each level are entitled to choose any possible action by actors below not forbidden by actors above, and actors below can only choose from among remaining possibilities. In a conditioned hierarchy, actors at each level can choose any course of action eliciting apparent assent from the group as a whole as that assent is elicited tacitly by the holders of the most collectively remembered offerings of assent; actors who do not seek assent can manage with only tacit permission or with being ignored; actors can tolerate active dissent if they feel they have other sources of support of some type. These are three entirely different decision procedures for access to choices. The fact that they are often used in combination does not affect their essential differentiation.

Because at least three different decision procedures for access to choices exist, there can be at least three different hierarchies of differential social power; whether others can or will be created is an open question, whether others exist or have existed, an obscure one subject to refinements of definition examined in the next chapter. Notice that what is really at stake is access to choice. Differential social power makes access to choice is an issue because socially one must choose in relation to others and their choices. Social choices are mediated by others. The least mediated choices are compensatory choices in an open market of goods; so long as laws are obeyed and markets are large and stable, choices in expenditure are almost unmediated. Choices in laboring for income are far more mediated; for most of us, once employed, this half of economic life is as restrictive as the condign hierarchy that supports and defines it. The choices of condign power are always mediated by the subordinates through whom one must act, and restricted by the choices of superiors. The choices of conditioned power are the most mediated, depending as they do on the
apparent assent of a large portion of some group, and usually also by some symbolic action of apparent superiors. In the realm of conditioned power, one’s primary freedom is merely in whatever choice of social group one has.\textsuperscript{28}

D) Integration of the Basic Terms of Theories of Power and Oppression

We can now have the necessary terms to complete the analysis of the relationship of the Young’s five faces of oppression and the prior tradition of three forms of power. If we examine particular acts of social power we can see which forms of oppression are built into exercises of power.

1. Start with an example of a sequence of uses of compensatory power. A customer walks to a pan shop to purchase one Gold Flake cigarette\textsuperscript{29}, now available in some shops for 2.75 rupees, but in others, where employees claim the price is going up despite the fact that the retail price per pack of 10 has remained at 26.5 rupees, for 3 rupees. He begins his walk confidently in the belief that he will be able to buy the cigarette. What are the facts that underlie his confidence? He knows that the pan shop employee would rather have 2.75 rupees than the cigarette, even though he would rather have one cigarette than 2.75 rupees. Why this systematic disagreement about the relative value of the money and the cigarette? The pan shop owner knows that he can purchase 100 cigarettes for 243.8 rupees. The customer knows that he cannot; wherever he goes, 10 will cost him 26.5, or 27 in other shops, and he cannot buy 100 on the retail market, so for him 1 for 2.75 rupees is a good price, so good that he may feel the pan shop provides a pure public service. Of course, he seeks the cigarette because he is addicted, which adds to his vulnerabilities, making him more exploitable. And he perceives 2.75 rupees as a good price because he is shut out of the wholesale market. Because of his exclusion, he accepts his tiny bit of exploitation by the pan shop owner, who gains .312 rupees on the exchange, expects many more, and for the marginal markup gets access to a customer likely to buy other things, such as pan, which has a markup of 1000\%, a substantial bit of exploitation. Pan is available nowhere else; it is created by mixing 5 to 10 flavors and must be fresh. Exploitation and exclusion again appear side-by-side. The customer allows exploitation because, for him, the alternative is exclusion.

What about the pan shop employee? His work pays little, but making pan has a high return; pan shop owners often become rich enough to become loan sharks offering 100 rupees to vegetable vendors each morning and getting back 110 each night, the customary, but not so publicized and praised, form of microcredit. The employee takes the job because his poverty excludes him from ownership; he needs capital for initial rent, stock, and protection. He accepts his exploitation by the owner because of his exclusion from other possibilities; he may hope that initial acceptance of exploitation may lead to the ability to set up his own shop, in which he will be able to exploit customers and employees because of their excludability.

What about the owner of the pan shop? He may know that the bulk of the 24.38 rupees he pays the wholesaler for 10 cigarettes, .49 rupees go to the wholesaler, 14 go to Central Excise Taxes, and that 9.89 go to the owners of the tobacco company, but he’s helpless to do anything about it. The owner accepts his exploitation because he cannot make cigarettes himself that his customers will buy, and no wholesaler is willing, or perhaps even able to sell them more cheaply, the wholesaler’s share being only 1.85\%; thus the retailer is excluded from that much larger range of profit.

The wholesaler also lacks the capacity to make his own cigarettes and is excluded from the possibility of buying them more cheaply. He is making a lot of money by exploiting pan shop owners a bit in bulk, so to him the prospect of accumulating capital to buy a factory and learning to manage one in order to increase his level of exploitation of others may not look attractive.

\textsuperscript{28} Hence the chief, though underrepresented, political significance of freedom of association. Ayn Rand’s idiotic ideology, with its romanticized fascist appeal and its total misapprehension of the relationship between compensatory power and everything else, owes its slight plausibility to one true insight, that compensatory power offers some potential for individual freedom because it alone offers discretely transferable rewards that can sometimes be used to implement relatively unmediated choices. For those trapped in the amniotic sac of conditioned power, this offers some hope.

\textsuperscript{29} All figures in this subsection come from an employee of the W.D. & H.O. Wills Company.
In this case the state gets 14 rupees, 52.83% of total retail sales per pack. To attempt to break in on
the state’s monopoly constitutes a criminal offense because the state’s monopoly of taxation is backed by
its monopoly of force\(^\text{30}\). Government officials rationalize this, when they feel called upon to do so, by
arguing that the government is properly constituted, according the government’s rules for itself, (to which
the international law of sovereign states, having no executive power over states, accommodatingly agrees),
and hence that its actions represent the will of the entire people, to which cigarette smokers, retailers,
laborers, and capitalists made themselves subject when they signed the Second Social Contract together,\(^\text{31}\)
an act they did not perform on behalf of, say, the Mafia and pirates.\(^\text{32}\) They may go on to argue that the
State needs the money\(^\text{33}\) or that the State does good deeds with it,\(^\text{34}\) and that cigarette smoking is harmful to
health\(^\text{35}\) and should be controlled by taxation.\(^\text{36}\) That the state can extract more from the cigarette smoker
than everyone else put together is a prime example of how one form of power can be converted into
another; here condign power controls and accumulates compensatory power on a larger scale than
compensatory power itself is able to. For this payment, of course, the state’s prime service is the protection
of private property rights, without which the paired functions of exploitation and marginalization could not
operate.

The main beneficiary of the state’s protection of private property rights, the tobacco factory
owners, otherwise sit on the citadel of exploitation. Exclusive ownership is not something they need to
defend on their own. If employees, or farmers, or wholesalers, or even the wandering unemployed
challenge it in any way, the state’s monopoly of force in the form of the police will come to the owners’
aid, not theirs. This enables the owners to exploit the tobacco growers, their own employees, and their
customers. From the customers’ payment of 26.5 rupees per pack, the owners receive 9.89 rupees, having
lost 2.12 to the retailer, .49 to the wholesaler, and 14 to the state. Of this 9.89 rupees, the total cost to the
owners, including all labor, tobacco, paper, filters, wrappers, boxes, printing, advertising, management,
overhead, and transportation combined is 4.5 rupees, 45.5%. 5.39 rupees, 54.5% go to profit for

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\(^{30}\) Jurisprudential theorists, most notably Hans Kelsen, rely on the notion of the monopoly of force. If fact,
of course, it is a theoretical and normative monopoly only, continually broken by patriarchs, caught and
uncaught criminals, organized crime, and occasionally revolutionaries. The same is true of the monopoly of
the right to tax, which in principle is broken by the extortion racketts of organized crime, by corruption, and
by the authorization of any required payments for which there is no corresponding good or service returned,
as is often true, for instance, of rent. “Nothing is certain but death and taxes” presumably implies that the
state monopoly of force is certain, thereby making payment for it and enforcement by it certain.

\(^{31}\) You do remember that day, don’t you? It was the 20th day of the Month of As If, the day following the
First of As If when we signed the First Social Contract, a while before we Latecomers happen to have been
born. Really we were there, just as all Jews were there when Moses came down from the Mountain with the
Ten Commandments and destroyed the Golden Calf, forever shaming them, perhaps with some assistance
from Original Sin, and making them work to redeem themselves. The State is rational, not mythical. Our
memories, poor craven individual creatures that they are, subject to the self-deception of vanity, are faulty.
(But the State forgives us if we acknowledge that ignorance of the Law is no excuse.)

\(^{32}\) A difference international law memorializes in the distinction between states and enemies of all mankind.

\(^{33}\) States that assiduously assert this on their own behalf have rarely used the argument to exclude the needs
of infants, the malnourished, the homeless, the disabled, and the unemployed from all taxation.

\(^{34}\) These State arguments, however, cannot be distinguished from arguments the enemies of all mankind
make on their own behalf, though the State does appear to have more extensive persuasive effect that seems
to correlate with the degree to which its monopoly of force exceeds the force other organizations have at
their command.

\(^{35}\) Which is certainly true but does not distinguish it from, say, military service.

\(^{36}\) An argument that clearly distinguishes between the State and the enemies of all mankind, who rarely
argue, for instance, that the reason they derive funds from prostitution, gambling, and addictions is that
these are harmful activities they are seeking to limit as well as control.

\(^{37}\) What the customer wants is the laborer’s labor. The actual relationship established between laborers and
customers becomes visible in the breakdown of the customer’s payment. Of the 26.5 rupees the customer
pays, some part of 16.98% (other parts going to capitalists producing cigarette filters and papers, machines,
to landlords, bankers, taxes, etc.), some part of 9.85% (other parts going to employers, landlords, tax, and
bankers) to the labor in making the results of that labor available to him. 52.83% goes the state monopoly
they could get a higher profit were it not for the taxes, but were it not for the state, they could not use marginalization to become enabled to exploit either the laborer or the customer. So the capitalists, out of necessity, compromise.

Investors and bankers, of course, may in turn exploit the factory owner, and may pressure the factory owner to increase his level of exploitation of employees. They can do this because they have exclusive rights to their investments, capital, and interest, and can, via suit, draw on the state monopoly of force to enforce those rights. The state may also pressure the factory owner to increase the level of exploitation; it may do this, for instance, at the behest of foreign investors through the World Trade Organization. At each level, it is the right or ability to exclude that creates the possibility of exploitation.

The farmer, of course, can make profit on his tobacco because he can sell it for more than his total wages to his workers, his debt, his overhead. The farmer can do this because he has exclusive possession of his land. If the laborers want higher pay\textsuperscript{39}, he tells them to seek it elsewhere. But if they go elsewhere, they are not offered higher pay\textsuperscript{39}. So long as they own no land themselves, they must choose between exploitation and marginalization, total exclusion from the possibility of working to support themselves. The farmer helps to keep his wages down by fighting against any more to redistribute land, assuring himself a steady supply of exploitable labor because it can always be threatened with marginalization.

At each step we see the pair: exploitation and exclusion. They presuppose each other.

Why, then, did Young not identify exploitation and marginalization with economic or compensatory power? She was thinking of exploitation and marginalization not as Janus faces of unilateral control of the means of production, but as separate grievances of organized groups. But does this mean they are separable phenomena? Only if you examine them as grievances. The cigarette smoker may complain of neither his exploitation nor his exclusion from the wholesale market because he regards his need of cigarettes as an individual, and perhaps somewhat culpable need. If he joins a Smokers Anonymous, it will be to quit smoking, not to demand lower cigarette prices or direct purchase from the manufacturer. If pan shop employees form a union, an improbable act because pan shops are small and separately owned, and because pan shop employees are readily replaced because they come from a huge marginalized group, their grievance of exploitation will appear in a different forum from that of the manufacturer’s employees and the tobacco farmer’s workers. If the pan shop workers organize to complain of the marginalization that

\begin{itemize}
  \item of force, and 20.34\% to tobacco company capitalists. Consequently over 73\% goes to purposes the customer has not asked for and less than 27\% goes to what he wants. What the laborer is working for is the customer’s money over 73\% of which is also going elsewhere. What is that 73+\% for? 72.2\% of it supports the government, 27.8\% of it capitalists (figures in other cases being roughly reversed.) One would think that this would make the capitalists regard the workers and customers as their greatest philanthropists and the government regard both as the greatest patriots, inspiring both capitalists and government to establish free clinics and build cancer hospitals and cemeteries, erect statues honoring their generosity, and have 21 gun salutes at their funerals. But some invisible hand has kept them from doing this.
  \item The state, relying on condign, not compensatory power, does not appear to have a precisely analogous argument to counter this, though it can and does claim its own employees are underpaid for their labor in producing the economic possibility of marginalization necessary to exploitation, and so taxes must be increased. The results show the state to be more successful in enforcing its rather tenuous argument than the laborers and customers are in pursuing their stronger one.
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\textsuperscript{38} The state, relying on condign, not compensatory power, does not appear to have a precisely analogous argument to counter this, though it can and does claim its own employees are underpaid for their labor in producing the economic possibility of marginalization necessary to exploitation, and so taxes must be increased. The results show the state to be more successful in enforcing its rather tenuous argument than the laborers and customers are in pursuing their stronger one.

\textsuperscript{39} Current wages in tobacco factories in Andhra are 40 to 45 rupees for day for women, 70 rupees per day for men, munificent sums that, if the workers had no other expenses, at retail rates would allow the best women laborers to sample 17 cigarettes a day and men 26 whereas, were they allowed to buy their own work at cost, the women could afford 100 and the men 156. Perhaps they are made to pay the retail price of the fruits of their labor to protect their health, in which the state has a strong interest, as judges say in public health cases. Here the interests of the capitalists and the state diverge. If the capitalists raised wages so that workers could afford to smoke, a larger proportion of wages might recirculate to the capitalists, but the capitalists appear to lack the self-interest or to have too great public spirit to raise wages.

\textsuperscript{40} Wages in agricultural work, including tobacco fields, are exactly the same. An illiterate laborer has the liberating choice of working indoors or outdoors, for the same pay. This is frequently explained on free market principles applied to labor, but uses of conditioned power among factory owners and landowners, a phenomenon akin to restraint of trade but not confined to one industry, might provide a stronger explanation. A strong upper caste social rule ostracizes those who “spoil the help.” The same rule exists in all upper class societies, but in more open societies ostracism is sometimes less effective.
compels them to work in pan shops, their complaint will be against the government, not their employers, and not the wholesalers or manufacturers who will not sell to them directly. If the pan shop owner complains of his exploitation by the wholesaler, the wholesaler will point to his contract with the manufacturer. If the pan shop owner complains of his exploitation from the wholesale market, the manufacturer will cite his freedom to contract to offer only bulk sales to wholesalers with orders above a certain level. If the wholesaler complains of his exploitation by the manufacturer, or of his exclusion from the purchase of unprocessed tobacco, he'll be told to build his own factory. If the factory employees complain of their exploitation, they'll be told to seek work elsewhere; if they complain of their exclusion, the factory owner will tell them to seek government help. The government might give a bit of help, but it will not take away all factory owners' and large farmers' rights of exclusive possession of the means of production. In fact, the government's offer of help will aggravate the problem of perception of the actual relationships, because the government can offer separate partial amelioration of either exploitation or marginalization of different groups without noticing any connection. Because the government offers will be separate, the grievances will be separate, and the groups with the grievances will be separate. But none of this makes exploitation and marginalization separable phenomena.

If exploitation could exist without marginalization, then whenever an employer said, "If you don't like the wages, go elsewhere," the employee would leave, and the employer would soon find he had to pay higher wages. This is what the classical theory of capitalism says should happen. But it doesn't happen when the ownership of land and productive resources are sufficiently centralized, because there is no place to go for work of that type at that level. If marginalization could exist without exploitation, then any potential employer could look at the mass of unemployed willing to work at anything for any amount, and would begin immediately to exploit some of them. So exploitation and marginalization create each other.

Why should any doubt remain that both are aspect of compensatory power? Solely because there are two other sorts of power that work by different rules. Conditioned power allows the formation of grievance groups. People find they have the same problem, and approve of each other's efforts to express it and act upon it. One group of exploited workers forms itself into a union. Another group of marginalized workers appeals to the government for assistance. When a worker is laid off, he eventually joins the second group. When a worker is hired, he joins the union. The union doesn't try to represent all the unemployed, whom they may regard as competitors and scabs eager to lower wages. The group of the unemployed doesn't try to represent all workers, whom they regard enviously as an exclusive elite that won't help them. Condemn power then exploits the existing envy, fear, and exclusivity by offering differential benefits and punishments for the two groups, reinforcing antagonisms. Employers or the government or allied social groups may organize violence against strikers or unemployed rioters. The police will treat the two groups differentially: the marginalized will be punished for petty crime while the unionized may be beaten if they try to resist the entry of scabs. Welfare will offer differential benefits from separate programs: workers will get one set, the marginalized another. At each step the grievances grow more and more separable. The political observer of oppression concludes that exploitation and marginalization are separate faces of oppression. But that is because the basis of the observation is political, and in politics they can appear separately.

It is not that the other three forms of oppression are not involved in concrete grievances of oppression and marginalization. They are, and profoundly so—and this is the reason that Galbraith's terminology, that does not tie types of power to discrete institutions, is better than Russell's. Cultural imperialism, for instance, is used to reinforce exploitation and marginalization. Blacks are traditionally paid lower wages than Whites, both because they are subject to more marginalization, and so must be willing to work for less pay, and because creating feelings of inferiority in them makes them via cultural colonization makes them tolerate both more exploitation and more marginalization. Differential treatment of Blacks and Whites keeps wages down because Blacks can be used to break White strikes, then abandoned whenever the Whites want to return to be exploited again. The upper castes in India make the same use of the supposed difference between Sudras, who form the bulk of the population, and the Scheduled Castes, who form the same percentage as Blacks in the U.S. The Scheduled Castes are landless day laborers brought in whenever there is heavy work or discontent among the Sudras, then abandoned with no obligation, for the upper castes do not believe they have any obligations to the Scheduled Castes. Blacks and the Scheduled Castes perform the role of disposable labor, and both are regarded with contempt by the strata just above them, whose wages and working conditions they affect. This contempt, moreover, brings into play a fourth of the five faces of oppression, the naturalization of violence. Each system allows Blacks and the Scheduled Castes to be beaten and killed with impunity. This naturalization of violence reinforces the
effects of exploitation, marginalization, and cultural colonization, and is reinforced by them. Finally, the fifth face of oppression appears, the creation of the feeling of powerlessness, primarily through denial of literacy and humiliation and intimidation consequent on all attempts to represent oneself. It combines easily with cultural imperialism, which offers it a system of justifications: Blacks and the Scheduled Castes, it says, don’t deserve education because they are unable to benefit from it. So those on the bottom rarely try to represent themselves, but instead give the representation of their grievances over to their supposed superiors, the foxes guarding the chicken coop, who are sure to say they are basically happy. All five faces of oppression can therefore face a single group. So what should one expect the group to do? It will unite as a group and learn somehow to express its grievances against all five types of oppression. But none of that means that five different types of power are being used against it. It can mean instead that the three types of power generate at least five types of publicly articulable group oppression under the conditions of welfare capitalism.

2. Are analogous relationships visible if we start from an example of what are clearly uses of condign power? A corporal gives an order to a private on the front line: “Private, advance to that wall.” The private tries to run across an open area to the wall and is shot. Why did the private take that risk? In the foreground there are two main factors. First, the private was well accustomed to the fact that the corporal can punish disobedience with impunity, in fact, with official approval. Though the injury from punishment would probably be less than injury from an enemy bullet, the punishment is more certain than the bullet, so the risk of punishment can appear to be greater than the risk of being shot. Second, the private is well trained not to represent his apprehensions to the corporal. As a private, he is at the very bottom of the chain of command. There is no one to whom he can pass the order on. Any argument he offers probably will be regarded as equivocation motivated by cowardice. If he tries to pursue an argument, he will be charged with insubordination, and punishment will follow. His act appears to him as the result of being forced down a kind of funnel, with his speechlessness on one side and the threat of violence on the other. He must shut up and move. So he does.

Why did the corporal give the order? His sargeant has commanded his platoon to attack snipers in a farm house. If the private will not run to the wall, the sargeant will tell the corporal he does not command the respect of his men and is not fit to lead. If the corporal represents himself by saying it was not his fault, but the private’s cowardice, the sargeant will say the corporal had a number of options in attacking the farm house, but not attacking it was not one of them. The sargeant may say the corporal could have gone first himself to give the private courage, or that he could have pressured the private more, or given him better preparation, or had him removed from the platoon, or ordered another private to go first, or ordered attack from another angle, or in another sequence, or under better covering fire. The sargeant will say that, whatever the corporal’s options were, he alone was responsible for arranging things as he did, and that once he has given the order, he must see to it the order is obeyed, or he loses his authority. And behind all this the sargeant has the threat of punishment for the corporal. As the sargeant structures the situation, both of them keeping in mind the threat that goes with the charges of insubordination and incompetence to lead, the responses available to the corporal are very narrow. There is little he can say for himself if he is disobeyed. He knows this. So when he tells the private to run, he is very serious. And when he tells the private to shut up and act, he is even more serious.

In the military hierarchy powerlessness to represent oneself and the threat of violence given with impunity, and even approval, occur together continuously at each level. Like exploitation and marginalization, the two create each other. One is speechless because speech brings violence. One suffers violence and the threat of it silently because the alternatives, speech and resistance, are both met with violence. Here personal powerlessness, willingness to be silently used as the tool of another’s will rather than representing one’s own will, is the counterpart of being exploited in the compensatory power system. The normalization of violence, the settled expectation that the result of speech or resistance will be violence against oneself, for which one will oneself be held to be not a victim, but a guilty party, and the superior guilty of violence against one will be held instead by all above him to be an enforcer of justice, for those above him hold him responsible to produce one’s obedience, all of this will be rationalized on the ground that one is a private, one’s superior is a corporal, and all privates must be treated this way by all corporals. It is the last element that seals the system, that normalizes the violence, which makes it unappealable. Its unappealability makes it a norm. The unappealability depends on class membership: one is a private, not a corporal, so one does not make decisions, but carries them out. Because one does not make decisions, self-representation is at best futile impertinence, easily transformable into perceived insubordination, a
transformation to be dreaded. The normalization of violence in the condign power system is the counterpart of marginalization in the compensatory power system. Exploitation is to marginalization as powerlessness to represent oneself is to the naturalization of violence against individuals in one’s group merely because they are members of that group.

Why state the analogy this way? Why not argue that exploitation is the counterpart of the naturalization of violence and that marginalization is the counterpart of powerlessness? Because the substantive or functional flow of power upwards depends on exploitation and powerlessness; marginalization and the naturalization of violence are the costs and results of what must be done to produce that upwards flow. The hierarchy of compensatory power can only be built by successful exploitation: so long as the people on the bottom remain willing to be exploited, those on top are enriched, and with their enrichment they can invest in new enterprises, take vacations, use their surplus money as they will. Enough will keep flowing upwards for them even to be able to dole out some to the unemployed, to pay taxes, to build infrastructure, and so on; they believe they will be able to manage the costs of maintaining the exploitation. It is the continuous threat of marginalization that produces the condition of willingness to be exploited in the workers, which in turn creates the compensatory power of superiors. Without exploited workers at some distance, via the corporate chain of command, through a foreman, through shares, or interest, or tenants, the millionaire’s wealth shrinks to bankruptcy, and he is merely another unemployed man who can no longer live on the labor of others.

In the hierarchy of condign power, for superiors the desired state of affairs is that all subordinates act on the will of their superiors rather than attempting to act on their own wills, or to express their own wills, or even, if that were possible, to experience their own wills. The normal functioning of the condign power system requires the substitution of the superior’s will for the subordinate’s. So powerlessness is the desired condition for the subordinate. So long as it exists, each act of the subordinate contributes to the power of the superior. A steady stream of power goes up through the ranks of subordinates to the top so that when the man on top says “March!” a thousand feet, a human millipede, move at once as if they all belonged to him alone. It is the continuous threat implied by the naturalization of violence that produces the condition of powerlessness among the subordinates, which in turn creates the condign power of superiors. Without an army, the general is a private person. A private is one who has no one to command—one whose condition is pure privation of power, a condign peon.

Liberals wish to portray marginalization as an exceptional event, something momentary and correctable, that profits no one. It is true that it does not profit the economy as a whole; it is a cost, not a benefit to the whole. But it is a cost of exploitation, and the same people who deplore marginalization refuse to admit its connection to exploitation, which is invisible to them because they hold attribute profit to other factors of business; they claim all profit comes from productivity, and that productivity comes from investment and management, invention and patents. But the value to business of patents and investment arises solely from the exclusivity of property rights, from their being rights of the possessor “against all the world” as the judges phrase rights in rem. And management has nothing to manage without workers. That leaves invention, the actual source of increases in productivity—a source that cannot be attributed to corporations, but to inventors, who are also workers, and generally the most drastically underpaid in relation to the results of their work. And there again, for the corporation, is the exploitation on which the corporation relies, and which it must monopolize through exclusive intellectual property rights, which again imply the social cost of a type of marginalization. So much for viewing marginalization as an exceptional occurrence.

Liberals similarly portray violence as an exceptional event, something momentary, irrational, and capable of elimination, that profits no one and injures everyone. It is true that it injures society as a whole; it is a net cost, not a benefit. But the victim of a crime is clearly injured more than society, yet criminal law does not aim to assist or compensate the victim, but to use the occasion of injury to step between the victim and the victimizer with the complaint of “society,” or the “state,” or the “king” as though what mattered was not the injury, but the breaking of “the law.” If violence is bad because it is injurious, do they therefore advocate replacing criminal law with civil law, do they advocate that the first concern should be for the victim’s welfare or the creation or recreation of the relationships between the wrong doer and the victim and the rest of society? No. Because they don’t believe violence itself is bad, they only believe disobedient violence is bad. Do they advocate the elimination of the police and military, of wardens and guards, parole and probation officers, of marshals, and of all those whose reason for existence is merely the regulation of their violence, of judges, executives, bureaucrats, prosecutors, and all those who serve them? No. Why not? Because they believe that the violence of individuals because it is disobedient, but state violence is good so
long as it is obedient, and because they know perfectly well that the kind of obedience that thrives on state violence cannot exist without the normalization of violence to maintain obedience. So why do they believe state violence is necessary? Because they know it is the only method to maintain chains of command, because the powerlessness necessary to make people act on someone else’s will rather than their own, that sensation of speechlessness which makes people willing to decline to represent themselves, can only be created by the continuous threat of normalized violence from above. What then, do Liberals fear? Democracy, the capacity of people to represent themselves openly, honestly, and competently, and to make decisions on the basis of full and open discussion of issues, issues which would have to include the question of how they want their compensatory power system to work. And why is that frightening to Liberals? Because they rely on the powerlessness of people in chains of command to normalize state violence against society as a whole so that the power of those on top can be maintained, without which they feel they have no security. And why would Liberals fear they would have no security? Because the structure of existing societies depends on the steady upward flow of compensatory power via exploitation and of condign power via powerlessness, and both marginalization and the normalization of violence are needed to maintain that flow, which alone keeps them near the top.

Now, why doesn’t Young perceive the obvious fact that powerlessness and the naturalization of violence are related phenomena of condign power? Why does she instead consider the naturalization of violence as something to which only particular social groups are subject, and as something primarily perpetrated by renegade social groups, such as rapists attacking women because they are women, homophobes attacking homosexuals because they are homosexual, and the KKK attacking Blacks because they are Black, each of these patterns of attack creating continuous threats that make the attacked groups feel vulnerable and obliged to act unassertively? Why does she consider them minority issues rather than general issues when it is clear that the entire condign hierarchy behaves this way, and must behave so?

Certainly attacks against “minorities” are worse than those against “majorities,” but that is a phenomenon of the modern liberal state in developed countries. In poor countries the police, the military, and bands of trusted servants of the rich and powerful often terrorize the bulk of the population, and always have. It is also true that in modern liberal states the police are trained to be respectful to the middle class, and the middle class has some effective power to sue state officials and organizations, so much terrorism is left to groups like the KKK and the Nazi Party, the Veterans of Foreign Wars, and gangs, whose activities are checked if directed against conforming white middle class men, but not against Blacks, or the lower class, or homosexuals, or any women who do not appear to be properly possessed by conforming white middle class men. Consequently to perhaps a slim majority of Americans, and a larger majority of Europeans and Japanese, the police appear to be controlled by the middle class and violence appears to be exceptional. The excluded minorities wish to be included in this comfortable setting and feel that what is at fault is the inconsistency of the condign power system in failing to take their rights as seriously as those of conforming white middle class men. This is seen as the action of incorrigible renegade groups who may also be seen, as Brownmiller sees them, as actually acting as vigilantes on behalf of widely held oppressive social (i.e., conditioned power) norms, but the grievances go to the State, which is seen as negligent but potentially accountable and possibly benevolent. The State, it is thought, should increase its power if necessary, and certainly redirect it, to punish these errant groups as justice requires. The State, it is thought, can be molded any which way. It can become open, honest, tolerant, consistent, and liberal; it can act on the pattern of the supposedly enlightened economic sector; it can follow the advice of liberal ministers and intellectuals, of systems and organization theorists; it can learn from its mistakes. To some extent it can. Some police forces are markedly better than others in this; some cities have markedly lower crime rates. But all of these assumptions about the state fail to perceive that the state itself relies on the same dynamic of the creation of powerlessness and the normalization of violence that the “minority” groups complain of. Powerlessness of citizens and lower officials before state power and powerlessness of “minority” groups before renegade group enforcement of oppressive “majority” norms are simply placed in different categories, as is the normalization of violence through the chain of command and the normalization of violence through official neglect of renegade group enforcement of “majority” norms.

The “oppressive majority norms” are in fact merely the norms of condign power itself. Oppressive they surely are. But they are thought of as “majority” norms only because the majority helplessly—powerlessly—concedes their primacy, not because the majority would concede that primacy if they thought they had a choice. So to think them majority norms only means that the condign power system succeeds in its aim of keeping the power created by inability to represent oneself steadily flowing upwards, and it succeeds in this through, what?—the normalization of violence itself. So if the state increases its
power, the power of those norms will increase, increasing the level of threat. An increase in threat is not necessarily an increase in violence, for violence is the failure of threat.\textsuperscript{41} The state does in fact respond by increasing its level of threat. It has to match that increase by a greater increase in reliability: what is essential is how the threat is directed, controlled, and exhibited, if it is not to result in an increase in violence. In reducing crime, it is well established that the severity of punishment is not significant, but increasing the probability of detecting the crime, catching the criminal, and conducting a successful prosecution is highly significant. This puts an enormous burden of competence on state officials. The question is how much escalation is possible in this direction. Officials seek constantly increasing technological power, larger data bases, larger ranges of weapons, more effective weapons, more efficient procedures. The U.S. is already the world’s most advanced cybernetic police state with by far the largest percentage of the population incarcerated, a far larger proportion under various forms of court supervision, and a disproportionately large percentage of both composed of minority groups having a strong overlap with the groups seeking relief and protection. How can all this be cured by increasing condign power when condign power is being used to enforce exploitation and marginalization and the effects of condign power itself in the form of the effects of powerlessness and the naturalization of violence? Again, Young is right in identifying the oppression of social groups, but wrong in seeing it in terms of particular organized grievances of particular social groups rather than in the structural terms of the general theory of power.

As with her failure to identify exploitation and marginalization as features of compensatory power use, her failure to identify the creation of powerlessness and the naturalization of violence as features of condign power has a basis in reality. The oppressions of condign power are compounded by exploitation, marginalization, and cultural imperialism. Exploitation compounds powerlessness because the weakness, dependency, and regimentation one experiences in work places where one has no real choices or creative powers make the apparent inability to represent oneself politically appear legitimate and of a piece with the need to make one’s power and ability flow helplessly upwards through the hierarchy in the form of tacit consent. Marginalization delegitimizes one politically because one fears the accusation that one is merely a burden on others and that failure to pay one’s way should properly, before the capitalist ideology, eat into one’s rights and abilities for self-assertion: whatever one says, it will be regarded, one fears, as merely a baseless demand for the dole, or as insupportable arrogance. Fear of marginalization, if one is still employed, meanwhile makes one narrow demands to employment, and to the very employment which

\textsuperscript{41} As H.L.A. Hart mentioned, any amount of physical strength is insufficient to make a person invulnerable to any other because anyone can injure or kill a sleeping person, (a fact Homer thought Polyphemus stupid to ignore); hence creation of a state monopoly of force may be in the interest of the strongest. Lawful maintenance of the state monopoly of force assumes that \textit{incapacity} to use violence is impossible to create and that \textit{lack of desire} and \textit{voluntary unwillingness} to use it are both unreliable, so security must be acquired by maintaining the threat of punishment by overwhelming force, thereby reducing \textit{willingness} to use of violence for all but the state, which is supposed to follow law in controlling the \textit{will} to use its own force. This assumption does not affect the \textit{desire} to use force, nor the \textit{occasions} for desire. But \textit{threat itself} arouses the desire to use force, which can overcome unwillingness to use it. The state’s monopoly of force can only be maintained by making its threat visible. The state is therefore inherently unstable, and so can only be maintained by continuous activity. The primary safeguard for the state in its activity is thus the state’s own lawfulness and the citizenry’s belief in its lawfulness, for without both the state’s threat is unpredictable and therefore arouses continuous desire to use force against it. When state officials sense their insecurity, they increase the level of threat, which normally also involves increasing the level of state violence, thereby increasing the citizenry’s desire to use violence. State officials respond to perception of the desire to use violence by attempting to create \textit{partial incapacity} to use it. But creation of incapacities to use violence (such as restrictions on weapons, imprisonment, curfews, pass checks, etc.) also requires creation for incapacities for other physical motions, and many other incapacities. The creation of incapacities reduces capabilities for economic, social, and individual activity as well as political activity. This reduces the resources upon which the state can draw, increases the desire, and usually also the willingness, to use force against it, both of which increase the level of anxiety of state officials. Increased anxiety on both sides produces unpredictable and unlawful behavior on both sides, which escalates the entire cycle. The only way out of the cycle, or to avoid it in the first place, is to \textit{reduce} reliance on physical force and to reduce occasions for desire, desire, and willingness to use force on both sides. This can only be done by encouragement of speech, by open listening, by negotiation, by planned change, by redress of grievances, and by direct and indirect rewards.
exploits one, thereby making one accept premises that betray aspirations. Cultural imperialism shames those it colonizes, making them feel they are perceived not to have the rights and competence of those who control and threaten them politically, while it makes members of supposed majority groups unwilling to unite with the demands of minorities for fear of degradation, and minority members unwilling to unite with their political and economic peers for fear of betrayal.

Each of the other forms of oppression meanwhile reinforces condign control through powerlessness and the naturalization of violence. Powerlessness and the naturalization of violence both increase the willingness of people to be exploited, the first by making them feel unable to represent themselves, to unionize, to enter rank and file movements within unions, to form their own positions, to insist that unions represent their demand accurately, the second by making them believe that dissent will bring violent unpunished retaliation, and that they must therefore accept their lot. People accept their marginalization is accepted as an inevitable result of the limitation of productive resources because the state, through bad and humiliating education, so limits their access to knowledge of their society that they feel powerless to contest the claims of politicians that loss of jobs is an inevitable consequence of impersonal economic forces and because they perceive their marginalized status as one that imposes unnecessary burdens on society, so that they would deserve retaliation if they objected. People also accept cultural colonization more easily when its stigma of inferiority and threat of entire exclusion from the larger society is backed by the threat of violence and the apparent impossibility of self-representation in any political forum.

3. **Conditioned power** presents the greatest problems of analysis, the fundamental work of which has so far been most insightfully done by Elias Canetti in *Crowds and Power* and by Galbraith in *The Anatomy of Power*. Structuralist analyses of category formation and linguistic, semantic, semiotic, and post-modernist analyses of interpretation and category formation are helpful, but tend to the essential relationships between conceptualization and action, which always exists in the context of condign and compensatory power as well as other acts of conditioned power, for which the phenomenology of the life world is better. Young’s analysis of cultural imperialism belongs to the post-modernist tradition. As she failed to clarify the relationship among the first four forms of oppression and the first two forms of differential social power because she failed to see that the forms of oppression were paired, and that one member of each pair represented an upward flow of power while the other represented its downward counterpart, though the analysis of cultural imperialism is illuminating and accurately represents the primary grievance of many social groups against uses of conditioned power, it more seriously misrepresents the working of conditioned power as a whole than her portrayal of the first four forms of oppression misrepresents the working of compensatory and condign power. There are two main problems: cultural imperialism, which would be better termed “cultural colonization,” is a special case compounded of two contrary sources of conditioned power, that from above and that which holds the grievance group together, and it is the result of two basic phenomena, not one, the first being an upward flow, the second downward. The two problems are related. They cannot be clarified without more basic definitions.

Pragmatism, justly criticized by Russell as a power philosophy that confuses truth with belief, nevertheless, by virtue of that fusion, provides the definitions of belief and emotion most relevant to analysis of conditioned power, for conditioned power is not the production of truth\(^{42}\), but of belief. In pragmatism, belief is a tendency to act in a particular way under a particular set of conditions. If it is not possible to distinguish between the relative potentials for action involved in two statements of belief, it is not possible to distinguish between the two beliefs, and so the two statements refer to the same belief. The difficulty in determining whether similar statements refer to the same or different beliefs lies in clarifying distinctions among possible conditions of actions and the precision with which actions can be carried out. Emotion is the felt component of a tendency to act in a particular way. From the outside it appears as a motive interpreted by others by means of the signifier’s bodily condition, sign, expression, and gesture; from the inside it may be experienced more or less fully and accurately, and is subject to vagaries of

\(^{42}\) Truth may have some domain in culture, but, lacking social power, has only indirect effects various conditions of belief.
interpretation mediated by significant others, figures at temporal and physical distance being represented internally and fragmentarily in different forms and modes.

The downward flow of conditioned power is mobilization of group norms, the production of beliefs understood in the pragmatic sense as tendencies to act in particular ways. The upward flow of conditioned power is dependent apparent assent. Both are conducted by emotion and by empathic relationship to emotion, empathy being capable of producing imagery and emotion even without mediation by signs. The molding of beliefs is accomplished with apparent rewards and punishments issuing both from the top and from the whole of the group or representatives at different levels: the rewards are graded between acceptance, pleasure in one’s company, and elevation in status; the punishments graded between distance, suspicion and avoidance, then repudiation and contempt, then vilification and reversion as different degrees and qualities of social isolation, and finally actual physical isolation, such as expulsions from schools and villages and confinement to attics, ghettos, and mental asylums. Anyone who has experienced long involuntary isolation knows its fearfulness; it can result in serious damage to one’s ability to present oneself and to speak, disabling one in social life with consequences as serious as those of crippling poverty, imprisonment, and serious injury.

Let’s examine an occasion designed for the exercise of conditioned power, a lecture at a school with a specially invited speaker. The students are told to wear their school uniforms to show their respect. Their purported respect is that of the lower members of an institution, as members of the institution; it is not a respect they can offer individually because their individual respect is not deemed worthy of receipt. They have respect to offer because they are members of the institution that conditionally donates some of its respectability to them so long as they observe its rules. Wearing their uniforms, they are members in good standing still regarded as capable of obtaining the institution’s respect upon graduation. They wear their uniforms to indicate this potentiality denied to children not students at the school; their uniforms signify that respect is in the process of being transferred from the institution to them. On their way to the auditorium, an offense by an outsider to them signifies an offense to the institution, so the institution protects them and simultaneously empowers them, for they can make limited claims upon outsiders and the lowest school personnel. To the speaker the student wearing of uniforms signifies that the institution controls the students and is thus able to transfer the respect of the students into the respectability of the speaker. So the leaders of the institution mandate uniforms in order to empower students to empower the institution. This apparent purported empowerment of the students, of course, derives all its power from its reciprocal disempowerment of each individual student, turning them from a collection into a mass, the student body as a visual appearance.

The student body now must be made to act as a body. In the auditorium the students are to sit quietly facing forward, not talking to each other. Talk with each other would signify that they regard each other with interest rivaling their interest in the approved speaker. Their apparent lack of interest in each other can only appear if they appear jointly; they must show their willingness to suppress that interest in deference to the speakers. They sit in seats to show that they are not ready to act; action is the prerogative of speakers, who may stand if they choose. Their seated unreadiness to act is supposed to indicate that they believe they do not yet know how to act; that they are to learn. Their willingness to ignore their fellow students reciprocally implies that they are willing to be ignored by their equals; their equals, their position says, have nothing to offer them in the sight of the speaker, and each has nothing to offer another that could compare to what the speaker has to offer. Their silent ignoring of each other thus rebounds on their assessments of themselves; on this occasion they feel themselves unworthy of interest except as a mass receiving value from the institution and the speaker. They are thus dependent on the institution, and their silence is an offering of dependent apparent assent. Theirs is not a neutral presence; it is assent. They may smile at the speaker; should look upwards admiringly; may laugh at jokes, but not in hilarity, which would signify individual pleasure or willfulness, and never when no joke was intended, which would embarrass...
the speaker; sometimes may and sometimes should applaud; but may not ask questions or speak unless invited to. Some quality of the assent is felt throughout the room; if it declines into neutrality, it is judged that the speaker is being rejected as a bore. If it deteriorates into hostility, it is evident that there is some mismatch between the will of the institutional leaders, as evidenced by their choice of a speaker, and the student body. So it is apparent assent that is flowing upwards, empowering the speaker and the hosts. No more is immediately required of the students. Instead, they are to devote themselves to giving that alone, in all its apparent purity. The students’ apparent assent acts on other students also; each student glances around, witnessing the level of the apparent assent of the others, offering the appearance of assent in rough proportion to the level of witnessed apparent assent. Each student feels a different degree of dependency on other students, the institution as a whole, and on the faculty and speakers, and each experiences different degrees and types of assent, or lack of it, or dissent, but the offering of apparent assent depends on subtle relationships among these factors, and it is clearly understood that what is at stake for the group is the appearance, to which individual existence is as subordinate as uniforms make the individual students. It is the offering of the appearance of assent that is effective in conveying power upwards.

The purported relationship between the speaker and hosts is to be regarded as an issue inviting explanation, which is always a display of conditioned power. A leader of the institution or a purported representative of the students, often both, may introduce the speaker. Offerings of mutual esteem are displayed. The introducer says that the speaker has generously taken time out of his busy schedule because he is kindly devoted to the welfare of students and is dazzled by the glory of the institution. The introducer explains when he first learned of the fame and importance of the speaker; the speaker says how impressed he is by the devotion and competence of the faculty, what promise he sees in the students, how he admires the chief administrator’s selfless devotion to the care of the young. All of the speakers display mutual support and esteem. They form, for each other, a funnel for the students’ attention; wherever the students look, they find their attention guided back to the importance of the speaker’s words, purported deeds, and ostensible personality. This funneling transfers esteem from institutional leaders to the speaker and back to the institutional leaders: the speaker is shown to be worthy because the institution is worthy, and the institution is shown to be worthy because it can acquire such an august speaker. This mutual flattery may be conveyed by multiple means—gifts, photographs, plaques, medals, grants, and honorary degrees from the institution to the speaker, and sometimes one or another from the speaker to the institution, always accepted with evident gratitude and humble protestations, gracious statements, tears, applause, bows and sweeping gestures, mementos of discipleship, pledges of loyalty and faith, dreams of the future, remembrance of the honorable past, enactments of tradition, caps, and robes, and insignia.

The speaker’s words, the deeds, and the personality are fused in the presentation. The words are to be understood, the deeds to be emulated, the personality to be admired. The students are to remember and repeat the words to themselves and each other, to carry them with them, to look for deeper and further reaching meanings, for implications for their own behavior. The words come in patterns of different levels; the speaker introduces approved usages that canny students can incorporate in their statements to teachers in the hope of gaining conditioned power over others, thereby arousing power struggles among students. The speaker offers propositions purporting to be true and worthy; students are to assume their truth, to apply the sayings to their academic work and, in a limited and visible way, to their interpretation of experience, to the discovery of situations to which some action might apply. The worthiness of statements is supposed to make them a guide to behavior; the speaker is purported to being assisting the students in distinguishing right from wrong, good from bad, the ideal from the mundane or prosaic, the practical from the impractical. The assumption here is that the statement of purported norms is a necessary—and, in authoritarian societies, a sufficient—guide to behavior according to them. Above or beyond statements there are other dimensions to meaning; what is denied and denigrated is to be a boundary one may not cross, and what is overlooked or ignored may be taken to be impossible, unimaginable, unperformable, or unperformable. Selection and arrangement imply principles of selection and arrangement that are to be intuited and used as models. Stories engage imagination; students internally act out various sequences that are supposed to lead to particular results; they are to regard actions in particular units assigned moral value. Expositions expound purported relationships among features of the world that are to be considered in a certain light from the purported perspective of the speaker, so that if the students understand the world in this light, they will share in the supposed wisdom of the speaker, and thereby partially become empowered to rise to the heights of his eminence if they accept the paradigms he so conveys downwards with apparent generosity—the secrets of his craft, the insights available in his position, his interpretation of situations he says occupy his attention, the wisdom slowly accreted by years of intelligence, training, and experience,
disciplined morality and effort all come dropping from his mouth as well-formed pearls the students can cherish because the school has so tenderly lifted them out of their prior incarnation as supposed ignorant swine unable to appreciate the better things in life, a status to which they might be returned if they do not listen with evident pleasure.

As the speaker’s words and statements are not discrete, neither are the elements of his deeds and personality. His deeds form a career celebrated by the badge of his presence. Rumors surround him, some of the positive ones mentioned by his hosts, others alluded to as too well known to require elaboration. If the students are of high status, they may seek him out later for accounts of his deeds. The speaker’s deeds are taken to justify or require his august presence, to explain indirectly and indirectly be explained by his speech, to explain why he knows what he purportedly knows, and to give evidence that he knows it. His personality is to explain his deeds; it was a man of his quality who was capable of his deeds, it was his personality and deeds that won him his reputation, the reputation that brought him to this honored hall.

The students are to learn from the composite of his speech, his deeds, and his personality. Part of each is taken to be hidden, but not hidden out of shame—hidden because they are too great to reveal at once. There is a depth to each, and to the three together. The appropriate response is wonder. How could he have become so great? Was he once a child, like the students? What sort of child was he? How did he learn what he knows? How did he become so skillful, so wise? In contemplating such questions the students are to form their perceptions of each other and themselves in the act of forming their perception of him. He offers encouragement; in a school like theirs, they can learn to be like him. The esteem of the school accordingly rises to the skies, transporting the students, guided by the faculty.

The offering of the students is dependent apparent assent; the imposition of the speaker is a set of models for perception and judgment of society and action in it. These models, or something supposedly related to them, can be imposed in active form rather than merely being exhibited to admiring view. The speaker can praise a student or teacher: “Now, as this sweet young lady has warmly said in her introduction…” or “As these smartly dressed young gentlemen in the front row surely know…” or, “As all of you have surely learned from your enlightened parents, so good as to send you to this school….,” Blame and repudiation are available: “You in the back, yes, you, you obstreperous young hoodlum hiding in the back pretending innocence…” or “People who lack the even the modicum of self-respect needed to keep their shoes shined…” or “Ignorant louts so engrossed in immediate gratification that they trade pictures of automobiles and slutish females instead of attending to their betters.….” On such occasions he has access to the combined attention of the group, which he is free to focus positively or negatively to influence the status of members, signaling elevation or initiating stigma, the seal of exclusion from empathic access to the emotional bonds necessary to communication, beyond it the threat of actual physical isolation.

But what does the speaker get from the assent of the students? Reputation. He may hope to be remembered by the students, but more usually, he hopes to be remembered by the faculty and administrators, to be invited to other occasions through their networks, to gain access to the good offices of the web of conditioned power they inhabit. Fame is instrumental; hence reputation is a possession, a social good, upon which one can sue in tort if one believes one can use condign power to reinstate it. The hosts and speaker use the apparent assent of the students to empower each other and themselves. The power of the students’ apparent assent, the only form of conditioned power they have, is partially transferred to the introducers, the speaker, and the institution as a whole, where it is converted into reputation, which, considered as a social good, is fame, which in turn, as a power, gives access to other sources of conditioned power, which may convert it into compensatory or condign power as well. Superfluous reputation, fame, guarantees one against the threat of contempt and social and physical isolation, for the loyal protect one from disrespect, and others has never heard of eagerly seek one out, offering favors. All of this is clearly understood by every adult; it is because it is understood implicitly that reputation is universally regarded as significant, that fame is regarded as a good, and that conditioned power is sought and used.

Conditioned power is subtler than compensatory power and condign power because it holistic, being dependent on apparent group perception; because it has both internal and external components, confidence and respect, subtly related to each other and subject to selective memory and expectation; can be affected by multiple factors; can be honored in one circle but not in another; and is qualitative as well as vaguely quantitative, its quantity varying in more than one dimension, varying in both intensity and extent through social relations, so that its quantity and quality are complexly related to the character of the society. One can have a reputation for one virtue or capacity but not another, and the character of one’s reputation can shut some doors while opening others, depending on the interests and perceptions of the groups to which one seeks access. Uses of conditioned power therefore have multiple impacts that cannot be fully
anticipated; thus users of it can resort to experts, such as media analysts, advertising executives, marketing experts, campaign managers, publicity agents, public relations men, and professors of speech, teachers of rhetoric, critics, ministers, publishers, producers, psychologists, sociologists, and even anthropologists, each of them claiming knowledge of particular categories of audiences and situations. Conditioned power is also capable extremely complex uses requiring the full resources of composers, poets and rhetoricians to exert and of musicologists, literary analysts, and social and political theorists to describe. It is no wonder that its analysis is so easily sidetracked into analysis of particular domains, that the parts are represented as the whole, or that no effort is made to represent the whole or the relations between parts and the whole. The production of belief, moreover, which is the object of analysis, is necessarily connected to beliefs about truth, and to the belief that some beliefs are true, and all of us have such beliefs ourselves, which form the assumptions of our analysis. I, for instance, conduct this analysis of conditioned power on the assumption of the basic truth of the previous analyses of compensatory and condign power and their relationships to oppression, and numerous assumptions connected to that, some of them more visible to you, some more to me, that make me structure this analysis in parallel with the other two. Another significant assumption I have not yet discussed, namely that there is such a thing as a cultural sphere of consciousness that forms concepts capable of adjustment to reality and expresses complexes of feeling, that it embodies the virtues of openness to experience and authenticity, and that it has in itself no direct social power, but is, as it were, an infinitely small, infinitely vulnerable thing. We cannot escape ourselves, and so must tentatively accept them, even with their limitations on our thought.

So there is no completing an analysis of the forms of conditioned power, of the oppression to which it subjects us, but there is no need of either. What basic terms needed are far simpler: its upward flow consists of dependent apparent assent, its downward flow of the production in others of beliefs that can form actions, and that the flows are carried by empathic communication of emotion, flows subject to blockage by contempt and repudiation, and to termination by social, and, ultimately, physical isolation.

Cultural colonialism can be analyzed in these terms. Cultural imperialists offer esteem to each other to produce a united front that can gain them each reputation, which reputation gives them access to wider sources of dependent apparent assent. In the activity of doing this, they collude in accentuating a broad complex of attributes from which others are relatively but not completely excluded, among them skin color, body type, hair color, dress, accent, diction, idiom, morays, customs, manners, acquaintances, allusions, thought patterns, styles of expression, and cultural knowledge. They selectively acknowledge and compliment bearers of these apparent attributes and denigrate those who lack them, thereby indicating to the colonized that conditioned power is available to them only to the extent that they mimic its possessors. When the culturally colonized do mimic the possessors, however, the cultural imperialists, to maintain their apparent superiority, change the rules of the game, making the colonized feel the onus of their real or purported mimicry by pointing out the elements that remain lacking, and treating the approach to their own condition as a travesty on themselves. The colonized therefore perceive that their dependent apparent assent is used against them, putting them in a double bind. If they ignore the imperialists, they are treated as irredeemable inferiors, but if they emulate the imperialists, they are treated as conspicuous imitators condemned to inauthenticity and shallow imitation by their apparent and fruitless attempt to usurp conditioned power. Some genuine superiorities of the colonized are ignored; others are stigmatized, and others are classed as imitation when they are in fact genuine. Thus the entire identity of the colonized comes to be at stake. They cannot be as they are, but neither can they be changed. The self-consciousness this produces in the colonized is dual; to the extent that the colonized feel imitative, and feel the imitation is successful, they feel it as a fraud covering an innate inferiority that can be exposed at any time, and the risk of exposure produces permanent anxiety. To the extent that the colonized feel authentic, they feel their authenticity deprives them of the conditioned power they need to live, exposing them to signs of disgust, detestation, scorn, contempt, and degradation, all of which can produce self-hatred. Both consciousnesses tend to produce compliance. The first calls for exposure to cultural imperialists, but drastically restricts behavior and modes of expression, turning one into a manikin. The second calls for avoidance of cultural imperialists, and self-denial of social power. The only way out is for the colonized group to assert its individuality and to rely upon itself for the limited access to social power it has. Each member of the group initially experiences extraordinary difficulty in facilitating the group’s ability to do this, for each one must take the risk of asking the group to risk itself, and has little conditioned power, let alone any other sort, to

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46 A phrase of T. S. Eliot’s one might find infinitely precious, but which I find accurate in its expression despite my doubts about its conceptualization.
exert in the effort. Social revolutions generally begin with cultural revolutions because they are conscious efforts relying on consciousness.

The other four forms of oppression necessarily increase the difficulty of the effort at group individuation. Exploitation and marginalization both reduce the group’s access to economic resources, rendering it unable to use resources for purposes of conditioned power. Exploitation not only wastes the fruits of labor on those who already have more than they need; it also forces the colonized to labor at tasks desired by cultural imperialists, instead of ones that can benefit the colonized groups, and forces the colonized to serve the imperialists’ norms rather than their own. Marginalization aggravates all feelings of inferiority, making people feel themselves as useless burdens on others, and therefore making them seek avoidance of attention, which need disqualifies them from cultural and social self-assertion. Powerlessness combines with cultural colonization, rendering the colonized speechless before imperialists in political contexts as well as social ones. The normalization of violence makes them fear retaliation for efforts at independence, for shows of pride, competence, and learning, as well as unpredictable repudiation of whatever is currently regarded as usurpation of conditioned power by imitation. In the net effect of cultural imperialism, and its relationship to other forms of oppression, Young’s analysis remains revealing and accurate.

The necessary amendments to Young’s analysis of cultural imperialism, are the following: 1) the oppression of conditioned power is far more general than cultural imperialism, which is a particular configuration of it. 2) The upward empowering flow of conditioned power is dependent apparent assent. This is oppressive because it deprives people of the ability to pursue their own social and cultural goals, and makes them contribute their conditioned power to the maintenance of others potentially hostile to them, who can use it to betray them and to pursue their own goals. 3) The downward flow of conditioned power consists of the imposition of beliefs about the good, the true, the beautiful, and everything else, all of which beliefs are potentially oppressive because they shape perception and action in the interests of the oppressors, and which are particularly difficult to free oneself from because they demand identification of the self with the social structuring devices used to influence judgments about reality. 4) The downward flow relies on diffuse enforcement mechanisms of conditioned power possessed by the group as a whole but directed by its more powerful members. Leaders use dependent apparent assent to remold the group by initiating group rewards and punishments, the rewards consisting of increased status, the punishments of stigma and potential isolation. Consequently, 5) the paired oppressions of conditioned power are more accurately described as the requirement of dependent apparent assent which creates a collective perception of emotional potential, and, by means of that potential, the imposition of beliefs both about the nature of reality and deservingness, with all the effects of both.

Conditioned power is the first learned but the last mastered, if it is ever mastered. Its learning takes such a long time because of its inherent complexity, its sensitivity to context, and its demands on personal commitment. Religion has long been regarded as the stronghold of conditioned power because of its basis in self-identification: one believes what one believes is what one is, and one accepts catechism because one feels unrighteous and wants to become holy. Religion focuses on the condition of the will, the prime locus of conceptualization, expression, and action. Religion demands the engagement of the will; if offered, the giving of apparent assent is rendered easy, the acceptance of belief feels naturally and genuinely formative of action, and failure to adjust action to approved belief is deeply felt as personal sin, devoutly to be avoided. The conditioned power of religion resists diversion by compensatory and condign power, so religion maintains itself as a distinctive social institution unless it can master condign power in theocracy, and possibly compensatory power also, when theocracy has that maximal strength which can alone lead to the perceived dissolution of the distinctness of the institutional form of religion by suffusing it indissolubly throughout a culture. Other forms of conditioned power, focused on other features of personal identity, lack religion’s capacity to impose distinctive form throughout the whole of human activity. Thus the demand for unity tends to take religious form, and religion tends to be the primary cultural institution on which others are modeled, and which best expresses the ideational and motivational patterns a group aspires to, however the fulfillment is diluted by redirection toward compensatory and condign goals and conditions. Ideologies tend to take on the forms of religion because no more efficient means than religion has ever been discovered to produce that predictable uniformity of action that creates group cohesion.

That cultural imperialism should be identified now as the main form of oppression by conditioned power is an artifact of the present global imperialism of the U.S., parts of Western Europe, and, to a lesser extent, Japan, including the cultural colonization of the U.S. itself, which is inhabited by a skewed representation of the rest of the world. Western imperialism of the globe has transferred a portion of its
condign power to the elites of relatively powerless ex-colonies, and other portions to the U.N., NATO, and SEATO, keeping its largest resources of condign power in the form of high-technology military force with cybernetic resources in the hands of the U.S. and its G7 assistants. The compensatory power component of imperialism remains firmly in the hands of U.S., with the same assistance. Conditioned power emanates from the same sources with the cooperation of local elites, primarily through the media, government, and government-controlled education, and it is designed to promote belief in the benignity and reliability of business and large government, which are presented as the forces of courage, good will, and progress battling chaos and greed in the form of monsters, ghouls, criminals, madmen, idiots, and other apparent non members of the secure and supposedly sensible well-formed and well-heeled white upper middle class, now with a few Blacks and women thrown into leading roles—mostly men attached to rich and powerful men who want the best, unless they’re going to be shown to be secret bad guys, in which case they’ll lose in the end because the good guys are devoted to using their power to root out evil wherever it lurks. This conventional scheme must be so consistently reinforced that if one returns to television after having neglected it for a few months, one notices that there is so little difference between the films, the news, and the commercials that it is difficult to tell which is supposed to be which. All of this, of course, may be classed as world-wide cultural imperialism, but its meanings and concomitants vary widely from country to country depending on the race, culture, and commitments of local elites and the attitudes of the audiences. Nepalese audiences, for instance, don’t distinguish between Eric Van Dam and Bruce Lee kung fu movies because they don’t identify with China. Cultural imperialism, though a world-wide phenomenon in different degrees, and certainly internationally conspicuous in “Orientalism,” as Edward Said argues, and of primarily light/dark racial distinctions implemented in the service of colonial power, as Franz Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth so eloquently argues, seems to be most intensely a U.S. construction of the grievance. Primarily it is the mixed U.S. population that gives rise to the combination of grievances of Blacks, Hispanics, Orientals, women, and homosexuals—and reflecting U.S. power relations with countries of origin on a larger scale—that Young identifies as cultural imperialism. In Japan elements of cultural imperialism emanate from the Samurai, strongest in condign power, residents of Kyoto, strongest in conditioned power, the Tokyo, Osaka, and Zaibatsu elites strongest in compensatory power, and the broader social power of Yamato men oppressing the Ainu, Koreans, and southerners, for instance, Okinawans, plus women, homosexuals, children over five years of age, and some culturally defined occupational groups, like the Eta, who offend Buddhists by working leather, a justification for allotting inferior status throughout Hindu and Buddhist Asia. Young’s specific description of cultural imperialism is a local composite of deeper, more elementary, and more universal social features, but it is obvious that race, gender, age, class, tribe, caste, sexual preference, language and dialect, religion, urban-rural distinctions, regional differences, and cultural display can all be used, and generally are used to create advantaged and disadvantaged positions in the use of conditioned power, and that supposed “minority”

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47 In ex-colonies, like India, women sometimes obtain leading roles, but are generally supportive, and all leading roles still go to representatives of the only the 10% of the population that is upper caste. If media imagery is a proper measure, cultural colonization is a more forceful in India, where people are relatively unconscious of it, than in the U.S., where consciousness is often acute. Indians are keenly conscious of the effect of caste on politics and, secondarily, on economics, but in the realm of conditioned power, nearly universal acceptance of marriage within caste, and of the exercise of conditioned power through family and caste ties, leaves cultural domination within Indian society itself almost entirely unchallenged, as segregated housing still is. In general it cannot be assumed that uses of power, even flagrant and injurious ones, correlate with grievances. For instance, in the U.S. elderly white women report the highest fear of violent personal crime, but have the lowest rate of victimization. Young Black men report the lowest fear of violent personal crime, but suffer the highest rate of victimization.

48 So the audience, being neither rich nor powerful, can identify with them by means of fantasizing their obtaining such a connection. The supposed heroism of subordinates, showing up the supposed vacillations of the powerful, is the strongest constant of American films, of which Rambo is the epitome.

49 In the case of women and homosexuals, status in the U.S. is intimately related to the status of women and homosexuals among the major trading partners and allies of the U.S.

50 “Minority” is a misnomer convenient for elites. Considered together, the supposed minorities always constitute the vast majority of the population artificially divided by differential elite action into minorities so that, by enforcing invidious distinctions, and competing for the limited goods the minority elites make conditionally available, they will identify themselves as minorities, thereby protecting the combined social
groups so marked and afflicted are also more likely to be exploited, marginalized, made powerless, and subjected to normalized violence.51

E) Hierarchies & Decision Procedures

Power cannot be openly contested continuously. It relies on forms. Thieves contest compensatory power in every act of theft and tacitly contest the condign power that institutes property law, but only

powers of the small elites from popular identification and expropriation. In modern society everywhere the system depends on principal-agent relationships masked as routine institutional employment in which the middle class present themselves as independent though in fact their positions depend on their willingness to act as agents to their principals. Only a small portion of the professional class ever manages to partially extract themselves from this condition, and they can only do so by securing reliable support founded on their having established reputations specific superiors lose the ability to control.

51 Therefore I, like I.M. Young, cannot share Galbraith’s basic attitude toward power, which he expresses on page 13, in the final paragraph of the first chapter of The Anatomy of Power: “Yet power, per se, is not a proper subject for indignation. The exercise of power, the submission of some to the will of others, is inevitable in modern society; nothing whatever is accomplished without it. It is a subject to be approached with an open mind but not with one that has a fixation of evil. Power can be socially malign; it is also socially essential. Judgment thereon must be rendered, but no general judgment applying to all power can possibly serve.” A subtle generality, subtly overgeneralizing. He concedes that some power can be socially malign. But that does not imply that that power is also socially essential, only that some power is socially essential; on the contrary, he also concedes judgment must be rendered on which power is essential and which malign. The problem may be that he does not have a vocabulary for systematically distinguishing between the two, so that any generalization, say, from Nietzschean assumptions approving all power has to approve malign power, while one, say, from soteriological assumptions condemning all power has to condemn socially essential power. But the reason for this lack of vocabulary may be that he has not considered power from the perspective that would make such a distinction possible. The wording comes from a man who once had a great deal of power, who claimed, in his Ambassador’s Journal, to have indirectly run the entire Indian government for six months after Nehru’s death while all top officials, who had previously deferred to Nehru in all essential decisions, relied on him to learn to assume Nehru’s prerogatives. (His choice of a final verb strikes me: “serve.” He knows that “serve” implies obedience to power. But what power must such a general judgment serve? One indirectly felt, like purpose his book must serve? Something abstract, like social theory, which might serve something else? The general good? Oneself? Or one whom one must serve, such as J.F.K.?) The way he asks the basic question on page 3 shows the parameters he has in mind: “Is it the threat of physical punishment, the promise of pecuniary reward, the exercise of persuasion, or some other, deeper force that causes the person or persons subject to the exercise of power to abandon their own preferences and to accept those of others?” His entire analysis is based on the first three options, so the fourth, “some other, deeper force,” indicates his awareness that those options he regards as foundational may be superficial. He knows he’s viewing the system from the top, and the view from the top is superficial. When one reflects that it is not only preferences that are abandoned, but most also abandon capabilities, access to necessary resources, self-respect, the ability to choose, and that among the deeper implied sources are, for many, somewhat reasonable fear of starvation, or death, and of absolute isolation, and that the great majority experience more abandonment of that which Galbraith identifies as mere “preference” while only a small minority experience what he, Nietzsche, and many others describe as “the joy of power,” the book, despite its candor and accuracy on many issues, may justly be charged with shallowness and failure of empathy. The same is true of Russell’s attitude toward power between 1918 and 1960, a period that unfortunately included Power in 1938. Young has made a genuine advance by examining power from the perspective of those on the bottom, where she has found five varieties of oppression. From the bottom those varieties do not appear to have discrete sources in the hierarchy above; instead, they collectively crush one from many angles. The structure of the exercise of power at the top of the pyramid isn’t clear from the bottom, just as the deeper sources of subservience to power are unclear from the top. But that doesn’t mean the two views aren’t connected. When they are connected it should become possible to convert the need to judge uses of power (“Judgment must be rendered...”) into a more articulate method of making general judgments, still obscure to Galbraith because he does not know the weight of power, handled so lightly by those on top, who can change others’ lives with the flick of a hand.
armed robbers contest condign power openly with any frequency. Those who commit violent crimes of passion may contest condign power, but normally not either compensatory or conditioned power. Revolutionaries and organized criminals contest condign power, the first also contesting conditioned power, the second compensatory power. Many people labeled mentally ill contest conditioned power continually, but their efforts are not taken seriously because they generally fail to perceive the connections between conditioned power and condign and compensatory power. Their occasional inept contestations of compensatory power often threaten it. Only the criminally insane also contest condign power.

The holders of power similarly do not expect attacks on all three forms of their power. Most of the daily routine of maintaining and increasing power is handled through conditioned power. Holders of power usually have some procedure for holding and vetting applicants for their attention: waiting rooms, secretaries, guards, security devices, unlisted phone numbers, secluded addresses, networks of associates and subordinates perform the function of guaranteeing that neither condign nor compensatory power will be threatened in an interaction, and that the power holder’s uses of conditioned power are likely to be successful. When conditioned power does not succeed, compensatory power is far more likely to be threatened or used than condign power, except when power is “naked” in Russell’s term, as is typical of totalitarian regimes, state terrorism, insurgency and its occasional terrorism, organized crime, and environments like prisons, mental hospitals, and some slums, where compensatory power is so rare that physical force is threatened whenever persuasion fails, as when a strong man with a vulnerable reputation believes himself publicly insulted on a point of honor. Use of compensatory power is of course the norm in public shops, where it can even override conditioned power so long as it does not threaten condign power. Customers are allowed to get into tiffs and show contempt on the presumption that they may wield more social power than the clerk or sometimes even the manager, and clerks are taught to restrain their uses of conditioned power for this reason, thereby putting them at risk of humiliation and servility.

Because it is universally understood that contesting power is a serious matter reserved for strikes and corporate take-overs in the compensatory realm, for lawyers, courts, and elections in the condign realm, and for intellectuals, religious reformers, and poets in the conditioned realm, power stabilizes itself. The general social perception the powerful rely on is that power can be thought of as a set of rules for decision procedures. Everyone knows that the general commands the colonel and the colonel the major, just as, in the legal hierarchy of countries relying on precedents, the judgment of a supreme court controls the judgments of district courts, which in turn control lower courts: the decision procedure of condign power is that the one on top chooses from the array of all possibilities while the one below can choose from the array not foreclosed by the superior’s maintained choices. In the condign system one must do what is required and may do what is not prohibited. This is the decision procedure: one is then free within that realm to make any choice one’s compensatory and conditioned power allows. But that, of course, only makes one’s choices free in proportion to one’s position in the other two hierarchies, which one is always compelled to consider, often quite against one’s will. The decision procedure of the compensatory hierarchy is that one is free to expend one’s labor, money, and goods in the way that gives the most return, which may, of course, be none at all, so long as one offers as much or more than anyone else present at the same time and place offers for the same labor, money, or goods. The decision procedure of the conditioned hierarchy is that one must offer the appearance of attention to one’s supposed superiors and may implement or not implement their paradigms of perception and action at one’s own risk within the groups exercising conditioned power to which one belongs, subject to the praise and punishment they will deliver.

The result of the continuous interacting exercise of these three rules is a set of three overlapping hierarchies which tend to have separate peaks, but bases from which it can be difficult to distinguish separateness among the peaks. For those on the bottom, ability to distinguish the character of the three peaks depends upon the vulnerabilities and consequent sensibilities of oneself and one’s group. Those particularly vulnerable in childhood to embarrassment, shame, and guilt are most impressed by the conditioned power hierarchy, attribute to it more effectiveness than it has, and seek to appease or reform it or both: among such people are those most likely to be committed to mental hospitals. Those most vulnerable in childhood to impoverishment tend to overestimate the power of the rich, and are most likely to violate conditioned and condign norms in seeking compensatory power, often in the somewhat mistaken belief that conditioned and condign power will follow in the wake of compensatory power. Those most vulnerable to violence in childhood tend to overestimate the power of the military, the police, the courts, and politicians, and are most likely to seek some form of condign power, often in the commonly mistaken belief that compensatory power and conditioned power will follow it. In all societies, of course, these choices are not free; many societies put such great obstacles in the way of increasing one’s power in any
form not dictated by the natural progress of the life cycle that most people experience little active hope of personal improvement of position in the major dimensions that trouble and diminish them. But however free or closed a society is, the steepness and content of the three decision procedures for assigning priority of persons are more active in creating and maintaining the hierarchies than individual action is. Hence the appearance that social powers can be thought of as social goods, either ascribed or achieved, rather than exercised and contested, as they more subtly are.

F) The Nesting of Conditions on Uses of Power

When Acton said that all power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely, he was thinking of condign power, and was asserting that political power is never used in strict accordance with law with the sole intent of serving the public interest, but is always used with some degree of personal interest, which necessarily means disserving the public interest, and generally also means some degree of illegality in using condign power to gain compensatory and conditioned power. This is true for three layers of the conditions of power uses, the top layer specific to the vulnerability of condign power to corruption, the second being a condition of all condign power, the third being a condition of all social power.

First, the “rule of law” is a euphemism. Though law is the creation of condign power, it is a cultural artifact that itself does nothing whatsoever. Only reciprocal expectations of its implementation, in many contexts, nil, and subject to extreme vagaries of representation and perception, give law any illusion of reality it has. Rule is only by empowered officials, most of whom receive their power by appointment by more highly empowered officials who empower only people they believe will serve their ends. Some few others, politicians, receive their power because people with compensatory, condign, and conditioned power, in the belief it will serve their ends, purchase, coerce, persuade or defraud the electorate into empowering their chosen politicians. In the activities of legislation, empowered officials, feeling and anticipating the impact of condign, conditioned, and compensatory power on them, use condign and conditioned power, and also compensatory power, power to create official statements of empowered group intent that empowered people can refer to when they want to if they believe referring to it will help to persuade others to facilitate their goals. In enforcement activities, empowered officials use condign and conditioned power, and, sometimes, compensatory power in order to alter those relationships of condign, compensatory, and conditioned power their superiors want, or believe must be, changed, or which they can successfully argue to their superiors are significantly illegal. In adjudication, condign power’s threat provides the motive force

52 In threats of suit, administrative action, enforcement of procedural rules, and mobilization of power blocs.
53 In threats to their images. Appeals to morality and sense may be graciously received, but have little effect.
54 Corruption through bribery is an effect of refusal of the condign system to accommodate its formal structure as a whole, that is, by public and express law, to the compensatory power system, so that the rich believe, as in most poor countries with newly monopolized wealth, that the effective way to gain their ends is by using compensatory power beyond the reach of government salaries, and officials come to perceive that the government is actually designed to deny the poor’s access to condign power and facilitate access by the rich through unofficial individual means. Relatively stable officially capitalist countries experience less bribery not because compensatory power plays a smaller role in government, but because it plays so great a role that the rich can receive what they want from government without bribery because the law recognizes property interest as the primary determinant of rights.
55 Primarily by enforcing procedures.
56 Primarily by persuading powerful people that proposed transfers are in their interest.
57 Primarily by arranging or authorizing arrangements of transfers of compensatory power from group to group, from groups to government, and government to groups.
58 The sine qua non of enforcement.
59 Merely an aid to enforcement; persuasion and negotiation here are always backed by threat.
60 Necessarily in payment of salaries, contracts, and transfer payments, optionally through solicitation and acceptance of bribes, usually extorted at first so that laws disfavoring the offerer will not be enforced, then, as corruption advances, so that laws favoring the offerer will be enforced. In enforcement activities, though they often transfer bribes, government officials rarely need to offer them unless the real issue is blackmail.
for everything else, for adjudication is only the decision procedure for the use of the state’s monopoly of force when someone wants to gain access to its use by arguing that a law has been violated. Compensatory power is always present in the form of judges’ and court personnel salaries and attorneys’ fees or salaries, and, in criminal law, in government expenditures on investigation, representation, and prison, parole, and probation, and, in civil law, in court fees, recoveries and penalties. Conditioned power is present only in a form both attenuated and forced, attenuated because it is, at all times, under threat of condign power, and forced because judges and those with derivative authority have the sole right to ask questions and the sole right to prevent unsolicited statements. All non-official actors, moreover, always need supporting

62 Hence the rich usually can win without bribery. See Mark Galanter’s “Why the “have’s” come out ahead: speculations on the limits of legal change,” Law & Society Review, 1974, 9:95-160.

These being the basic activities of government, it should be no surprise that condign power corrupts. All officials are permanently backed by threat, so all information they receive is in deference to threat, and is produced either in order to avert threat to oneself or inflict it on another. The desires to avert and inflict threat lead to attempts to avert or inflict it by means of compensatory and conditioned power, but the available means of conditioned power are attenuated by threat itself. Whatever rules are made to limit the use of compensatory power, whenever the threat of condign power is sufficiently imminent and the use of conditioned power sufficiently restricted, those who have it and are not controlled by conditioned power will seek to use compensatory power if they have confidence that its use can be effective and cost effective and that a relevant official is vulnerable to its use.

The second, more general, condition is one of the peculiar sort of vulnerability that officials in the condign power system necessarily have. Theirs is an empowered vulnerability, not the vulnerability of private persons. To be an official is to be empowered to exert condign power over others, a power the scope of which progressively narrows as one descends the hierarchy until it may be reduced to the choice of whether or not to stamp an application for a driver’s license. It is nevertheless a sort of power denied to others, hence on which others depend. It may appear negligible, but it is not. It is not because every official in good standing expects his actions to be backed by higher officials, so the entire weight of the state is potentially available at each decision point. Whether the lower official will in fact receive the backing of superiors depends on many factors, the first of which is supposed to be whether the higher official understands the lower official’s act as ministerial or discretionary. If the lower official believes the action will not come to the focused attention of a higher official, the lower official can assume the weight of the institution will be on his side. This, in fact, is the normal assumption of the citizen; only citizens believing they have access to some substantial condign, conditioned, or compensatory power themselves believe they have the ability to successfully challenge an official. Consequently the lower official generally can rely on the deference normal before condign power. If the lower official’s assumption is wrong, one of three sequences is initiated. First, if the higher official believes he can argue that the action was discretionary, then his support of the action depends on his assessment of the relevant power relationships in the hierarchy. His own relationship with the lower official is at stake, so he has an initial strong incentive to back discretionary actions. If the action is very clearly discretionary, he also has a strong disincentive to interfere because he will not only lose the loyalty of that lower official, but may also suffer damage with other officials in that class, and even damage in relationships with superiors who want things to run smoothly. Second, if the higher official believes the action was ministerial and correctly performed, this raises his own ante in his assessment of power relationships, empowering him to defend the subordinate against any attack, thus generally securing his backing of the subordinate. Third, if the higher official believes the action was ministerial and incorrectly performed, this makes him assess the relevant power relationships more closely. If he believes higher officials will approve, or corruptly want, the incorrect action, or if he believes he can keep knowledge of the action confined within an area of the hierarchy he controls, he can, or may need to, approve it. If he believes higher officials will not approve, and that it cannot be concealed from them, he is likely to take corrective action. The possibility of corrective action is
therefore quite slim. Officials know this and rely on it, and the public in turn assumes it—all except for those who believe they can wield power themselves. Consequently nearly all assaults on decisions by the condign system come from those high in the three hierarchies, first from those connected to other areas of the condign system itself, second from those high in the compensatory system—because it necessarily has more relationships with the condign system, which defines and supports it—and third and last from those high in the conditioned power system, who generally know less about condign power and have fewer connections with it. This ordering is also known by every partially sophisticated person, and that knowledge itself reinforces the pattern. The result is that the condign system is primarily affected only from above, from within different niches in its own hierarchy, and so is generally a closed system, and that where it is open, it is more open to compensatory than conditioned power. Thus the general conditions of condign power create either corruption or systematic negotiated accommodation to the forces that have the power to corrupt. What is called corruption is instances of particular accommodation without systematic negotiated accommodation; the latter, far more general phenomenon, is not called corrupt because it has been legalized. Legal officials suppose law obliges them to follow law exclusively, not “mere morality” as many American judges have called it, so whatever one’s moral views, they are to be held in suspense before the law, effectively nullifying them, so that they become mere personal vanities for verbal display, not for action. Hypocrisy thus itself becomes normal. Before that “norm” (actually a norm of anomie) conditioned power is nugatory. Compensatory power is the only source of social power left. All that condign power has to control it is the commitment of officials to its own law, but that commitment has been vitiated by the separation from conditioned power. It is not a moral commitment, but only a commitment to the system of condign power, which thus boils down to its elements, fear of superior power and love of exercising the power of threat, with its incidents of violence to keep threats credible.63 The rule that all power corrupts follows from the systematic pressures on the condign hierarchy to yield this result. That particular officials can sometimes resist some pressures does not mean that any official can function without ignoring some outright corruption and construing acts personally regarded as immoral in their intentions or effects as permissible, perhaps circumstantially necessary, and sometimes requiring praise. All officials praise uses of condign power, and hold much unwillingness to use condign power incompetent, cowardly, or irresponsible. This attitude in itself corrupts, for uses of power come to be judged more by their purported ends than means, though ends are imaginary until reached and even then only with unanticipated concomitants and consequences. Only means are actually within one’s control, and therefore are what one must be responsible for, the end being only a conventional basis for rationalization. Reliance on threat, the sine qua non of condign power, corrupts.

The third, deepest layer, supports all uses of power, not only condign power. All social power connotes some failure of some social value and of response to social need. Compensatory power is based on failure to share, to accept responsibility for the effect of one’s actions on others, and for those who cannot do productive work, compounded by lying about the value of others’ work in order to deprive them of the fruits of their work so that one need not labor oneself. Condign power is based on the failure to cooperate with others but instead to threaten them to serve one’s own interests or the interests of some organized group. Conditioned power is based on unwillingness or inability to listen empathically to others, but instead to extract attention from them in order to tell them what to think and feel.

G) Conclusions on the Relationships between Power and Oppression

The hierarchies of social power are hierarchies of willingness and ability to do these things to other people. If we seek to rise in a hierarchy, it is because we represent to ourselves exercises of power over others as means to obtain social goods for ourselves and our own, rather than as actions affecting other people. Though the oppression of the upper layers of society on all of us and our desire to grow through our life cycles creates some need to rise socially, the closer one approaches the apices of the social hierarchies, the more the desire to rise reveals greed, cruelty, and hypocrisy or fraud partially concealed from oneself.

63 This approaches the pure dominance of condign power that Russell calls “naked power” in contrast to “traditional power,” power with social support, that is, enveloped in conditioned power. Naked power often takes the form of kleptocracy if there is anything left to steal in a society with its productivity drastically reduced by systematic untrustworthiness.
The painful truth, however, is that we have cornered each other into creating this generally vile behavior. The fact that the desire to rise contains cruelty does not mean that a large majority of people on earth do not actually need to rise. They need to because those who have risen before them oppress them, denying them the benefits of their labor and secure access to what they need though it is plentifully available\textsuperscript{64}, denying them the ability to make decisions by intimidating them with irrational violence, extracting their respect and attention for their own glory, and inculcating idiotic ideas and groundless self-hatred. So long as the vast oppressed majority continue to allow themselves to be exploited and marginalized, to be made powerless and intimidated by the threat of violence, and to put their stamp of approval on nonsense directing their attention away from the sources of their misery and misconstructing their relationships with their oppressors, the world will remain a place in which we cannot begin to treat each other decently without exposing ourselves to continuous risk of abject poverty, violence, and isolation or degradation.

Given the conditions imposed on them, it is rarely the fault of the majority that they do not go on a general strike, for they lack access to resources to support themselves without exploitation. It is not at all their fault that they do not revolt, for the force mounted against them has now become literally unimaginable and, by multiple means, they are forbidden to represent and organize themselves. It is only partially their fault that they rarely learn what they need to learn, for if they do not allow themselves to be misled by lies and misrepresentations, they are isolated and scorned. Therefore the onus is on the rich to lower their rates of exploitation and return some of the surplus value they have extracted, on the powerful to reduce their use of force, to learn to listen, and to allow themselves to be supplanted, and on the famous to reveal themselves with some humility and honesty, and to cease their denigration of what they do not understand. Motion must be initiated from both the top and bottom, and assisted by those in the middle. Those on top should not be respected for using the specter of revolution as their excuse for repression, nor be relieved of the genuine moral obligations they have incurred in their exercise of power by their extraction of others’ labor, obedience, and attentive conformity. Those on the bottom should not be praised for relinquishing themselves to exploitation, self-discrediting and mindless obedience, and self-denigration under the impact of the actualized and potential threats of marginalization, the normalization of violence, and the denigration of cultural imperialists. Those in the middle must learn to understand their positions clearly, must learn they have more in common with those below them than those above them, and that their dignity and integrity lie in finding and respecting their roots, not in emulating the powerful.

\textbf{H) Comparative Chart of the Forms of Power}

The following chart shows the parallelism of the hierarchies of power. Each is based on a decision procedure for awarding priority using its own means of defining the quality what flows and its quantity, an upward flow that empowers those above with the resources of those below, and a downward flow of actions and transfers that shapes the upward flow and keeps it coming.

\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Basic Terms for Forms of Power:} & \textbf{a) from Russell’s Power: A New Social Analysis (1938)} & \\
& economic & political & social \\
\hline
\textbf{b) from Galbraith’s Anatomy of Power (1983)} & compensatory & condign & conditioned \\
\hline
\textbf{c) from Weber’s Wirtschaft und Gesselschaft} & class & power & status \\
\hline
\textbf{d) from Beteille’s Caste, Class, and Power} & class & party & caste \\
\hline
\textbf{e) from Marx’s Capital} & material base & executive committee of the superstructure & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

\textsuperscript{64} This is certainly true on a world scale; in 1999, the gross world product was already $6980 per person per year in purchasing power parity dollars, an income sufficient to provide adequate food, housing, education, and medical care for anyone. Because of the wastefulness of rich countries, it is not yet true of low income countries. The yearly UNDP \textit{Human Development Reports} are the best single source of relevant information.
ruling class and its servants

**Foundational Conditions of Vulnerabilities:**
- scarcity & inhospitality of nature
- human capacity to inflict violence
- human capacity to exclude from human world

**Basic Foundational Vulnerabilities:**
- weakness relative to nature
- weakness relative to others
- dread of isolation

**Expanded Foundational Vulnerabilities:**
- Threat of pain, disability, & death
  - by natural causes, primarily
  - by hostile or negligent human agency, primarily arising from competition caused by perception of scarcity or by violence of agents of monopoly of force instituted to control dimensions & results of competitive conflict.

**Foundational Needs arising from Vulnerabilities:**
- security from deprivation
- security from violence
- security from isolation

**Quality**
- Divisibility: discretionary/mandatory
- Identification/expression

**Potential for Quantification:**
- Cardinal
- Ordinal
- Qualities in holistic relation in group perception

**Traditional Perceptions of Social Powers as Social Goods:**
- Fetishism of commodities
- Treatment of the ready-to-hand as present-at-hand
  - Typical of “relativism” and structural anthropology.
- Theocractic understanding of economics as social roles
- Blackstone’s “black letter law”
- Most natural law theories
- American perception of positive law separate from politics
- Elizabethan conceptions of rank and station in life
- Conflation of culture and conditioned power
- Conceptions of religion as ideals devoid of social power
- Perceptions of high culture unrelated to economics, politics and unrecorded daily life

**Social power defined as goods individually sought:**
- Wealth, luxury, display, comfort, pleasure, interest
- Power, authority, command
- Fame, prestige, status, esteem, reputation for goodness & competence

**Social power defined as means to individual ends:**
- Secure sufficient income
- Productive unexploited work
- Embodiment of self in product
- Competence to represent oneself
- Freedom from intimidation
- Capacity to make decisions
- Respect
- Social intercourse
- To love and be loved

**Social Power defined as General Social Goals:**
- Egalitarian development
- Justice
- Community, communion
**Public Goods of a Tolerable Order:**
- Opportunity, pleasure
- Order, security
- communication, harmony

**Arrangements of social power resulting in experience of social goods:**
- Physical pleasure: security
- Freedom from fear of want: freedom from fear of violence
- Cooperative productivity: genuine participation in decision-making

**Structural Principle of Upward Flow of Power:**
- Exploitation of surplus value of labor directly, embodied in goods, or in money: obedience to superiors served by powerlessness to act on or to represent one’s own will
- Exclusion from use of property in all forms and from possibilities requiring use of property: threat maintained by normalization of violence against categories of actors or persons

**Structural Principle of Downward Flow of Power:**
- Effect of surplus value on use of property: apparent sharing of forms of readiness to act with those on whom one depends
- Threat of violence to act against categories of actors or persons: apparent approval and disapproval of forms of readiness to act, i.e., mobilization of group norms

**Transformations** (subject to laws, ethics, morays, and other limitations)
- Power for wealth → Wealth for power → Power for prestige
- Prestige for wealth → Prestige for power → Prestige for wealth
- Wealth for power → Power for wealth → Prestige for power
- Wealth for prestige → Prestige for wealth → Power for prestige

**Flow Downwards (partial list):**
- Wages: commands
- Retail goods: rules
- Money without surplus: monopoly of force
- Loans: rights
- Credit: powers
- Power to sue (t): transfer payments (t)
- Theft by the poor: benefits of litigation (t)
- Solicitation of bribes (t)

**Flow Upwards (partial list):**
- Labor: obedience
- Newly produced goods: self-control
- Money with surplus: duties
- Debt service, interest: liabilities
- Debt: taxes (t)
- Liability to suit (t): bribes (t)
- Legal fees (t): payment of recoveries (t)
- Theft by the rich: flattery

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68 Part of the flow of political power upwards and downwards derives from the flow of economic power, and part of it is transformed into the flow of economic power. The other way of formulating this verbally is to say that part of the flow of economic power is transformed into political power and part is transformed into political power. For instance, economic power in the form of taxes flow upwards through the political hierarchy to give the political hierarchy unilateral discretionary power over those of its activities which are defined as requiring payment. Political power moves economic power in the form of government transfer payments from economic power in the form of tax money through the political hierarchy back into various positions in the economic hierarchy. Economic power in the form of bribery acquires political power by utilizing the government’s monopoly of force for purposes it has not been mandated to serve. Solicitation of bribes uses political power to gain officials economic power.

69 “(t)” stands for “transformation.”
**Basic Forms of Group Oppression:**

- Marginalization/exploitation
- Naturalization of violence/
- Creation of powerlessness
- Requirement of dependent apparent
- Assent/
- Imposition of models & norms, for which conformity is rewarded
- Increase of status within the group
- Nonconformity & difference punished by stigma and isolation
- Through diffuse group action

**Character of Choices for those near tops of Hierarchies:**

- Nearly unmediated free choice among wide alternatives but with expendable power on a large stable open market for goods if one exists. If private property in productive resources is backed by state power, labor market highly mediated and restrictive even at high levels, but near top income from investment replaces labor.
- Privilege: expectation of solicitation of one’s preferences and apparently voluntary service and appreciation from diffuse sources. The famous are sought after and admitted everywhere as honored guests. They feel guaranteed security against isolation because people they do not know seek them out.

**Character of Bondage for those near bottoms of Hierarchies:**

- Need to sell one’s labor according on another’s terms on pain of starvation
- Need to offer powerless obedience to serve on pain of potentially inescapable punishment
- Need to exhibit apparent respect in soliciting preferences of superiors on pain of stigma and isolation

**Primary Loci of Expenditure and Transfer of Energy:**

- Workplace, market, property, finance (and, in capitalism, increasingly sport, entertainment, travel, education, intellectual activity, culture, religion)
- Government, law, police, military (and workplace in socialism)
- Family, religion, culture, education, sport, entertainment, travel, intellectual activity, friendship

**Terms Connoting Positive Evaluations of Uses of the Three Forms of Power:**

- Employ
- Purchase
- Coerce
- Command
- Order
- Impress
- Persuade

**Terms Connoting Negative Evaluations of Uses of the Three Forms of Power:**

- Bribe
- Threaten
- Intimidate
- Defraud

**Instrumentality**

- Entitlement exchange
- Corresponding rights and duties
- Or powers & privileges
- Justifications/constructs

**Decision Procedure:**

- Richest attempt to monopolize sources of rewards because they must expend entitlements to procure obedience with tokens that can be used with
- Most powerful chooses first from greatest array of possibilities because commands the most people over greatest range; second most powerful chooses next, etc.;
- Less esteemed defer to and imitate the more esteemed in hope of maintaining or gaining esteem.
- Quality of esteem depends on control of group perception,
some freedom of choice to procure obedience from others in turn. Expendability of power is primary issue.

ones at bottom get only what no one above desires. Obedience can be obtained without reward, so expendability of power is secondary issue.

Forms of Invalidation of All or Some Participatory Rights for Actual or Potential Rule Infringement:

Debtor’s prison  
bankruptcy  
poor house  
maintenance by state  
incapacity to contract (also political)  
lien  
bonded labor, indentured service  
slavery (involves all three forms)  
unemployability  
imprisonment  
Parole  
Probation  
Surveillance  
contractual incapacity (also economic)  
ineligibility to vote  
dishonorable discharge  
restraining order  
slavery (involves all three forms)  
extradition  

Advantages Accruing to People on Top:

Satisfaction of needs  
Security for future satisfaction  
Productivity through increase of capital intensivity  
Ability to save and prepare for future expansion  
Removal of need to distinguish between needs and wants  
Freedom of choice  
Power over others through payment  
Pleasure  
Comfort through protection from natural contingencies  
Ability to offer largesse

security from threats  
access to institutional resources  
power to command  
through bestowal of privileges  
power to challenge & question veracity, knowledge, & competence of those below  
power to institute new relationships  
continual witnessing of one’s power through trepidation of underlings  
ability to negotiate with equals & superiors in other hierarchies

Injuries to People on Bottom:

Hunger, disease, etc. through deprivation of needs  
Insecurity  
Labor intensivity  
Inability to save or prepare for Future  
Necessity to distinguish between needs and wants  
Restriction of choice  
Dependency on others  
Lack of pleasure  
Discomfort from exposure to natural contingencies  
Dependency on charity  
Fear  
Need to avoid the powerful  
Need to obey without question

Inability to criticize  
Inability to follow and create logical sequences because elements are dictated by authority and perception of forbidden relationships is suppressed

Position of People in Middle who Transmit Flow from Top to Bottom and Back:

Fear of falling income  
Fear of consequences of  
Fear of embarrassment

Removal of need to distinguish between needs and wants  
Restriction of choice  
Dependency on others  
Lack of pleasure  
Discomfort from exposure to natural contingencies  
Dependency on charity  
Ability to offer largesse  

security from threats  
access to institutional resources  
power to command  
through bestowal of privileges  
power to challenge & question veracity, knowledge, & competence of those below  
power to institute new relationships  
continual witnessing of one’s power through trepidation of underlings  
ability to negotiate with equals & superiors in other hierarchies

advancements in science & technology, & the processes by which science makes all belief tentative, a barrier to transfer of beliefs by absorption from others
Consumerism Managerial aspirations Purchase on credit Equation of work, obedience, and self-discipline disobedience Cultivation & enforcement of differential behavior towards inferiors and superiors legalism Cultivation of discrete feelings & judgments motivating differential behavior towards inferiors and superiors ideal of cleanliness suppression of feeling

Dependency Structure:
Exploiter depends on group of exploited but exploited depend on individual exploiter or united exploiters to avoid exclusion from means of production by marginalization, which brings complete dependency or death.

Powerful depend on obedience but if one subordinate is disobedient the powerful can command others to discipline that one. Violence is normalized for oppressed groups, who cease representing their own interests, instead empowering their oppressors to represent them.

The esteemed support each other with displays of mutual esteem in order to elicit esteem from below and pretend the devalued have no option before a united front. The respect the devalued show is taken as valueless because it comes from a disrespected and unindividuated source, merely the due of the esteemed by some natural right.

Feedback Loops Causing Institutionalization by securing winners against losers and denying alternatives to losers:
Public defense of unilateral control (private or public) of limited productive resources makes individuals powerless before employers. Realistic threat of marginalization makes employees accept expropriation of surplus value. Employers use surplus value to intensify exploitation of employees, to advertise goods to exploit consumers, & to marginalize inventors who will not allow exploitation of patents. Employers get benefit of real counterpart of fallacy of composition: while it is true that each individual does not want to be exploited, the whole work force allows it. Employees get injury of counterpart of fallacy of division: though whole work force suffers exploitation, each individual accepts it because if one does not, another will allow it in preference to marginalization. Actual marginalization is always maintained at some publicly visible level so that exploitation can appear preferable.

If dominant group uses violence to terrorize subordinate groups into submission, merely because of membership in subordinate group, individual in subordinate group will not obtain group support for challenging violence. The invulnerability of violent members of dominant group frees them to commit more violence. Attempts by subordinate group members to represent themselves are frustrated because their group membership makes them vulnerable to violence, so they let more powerful people represent them to the dominant group. This puts representation of subordinate group demands in the hands of the dominant group, who are then free to ignore actual demands of the subordinate group. Subordinate group members then come to believe they are incapable of representing themselves and indoctrinate themselves in powerlessness, relieving dominant group of political labor, thereby increasing efficiency of domination.

One group claims superiority to another in culture, style, speech, dress, knowledge, appearance, habits. Members of the dominant group support each other in public, approving of each other in all these aspects. Members of subordinate groups find they cannot obtain approval unless they imitate members of the dominant group. However, when they do imitate the dominant group, the receive not the full approval the dominant group gives itself, but only conditional approval based on their continuing and augmenting the imitation, the underlying premise being that it is only imitation. This heightens awareness of being a member of the subordinate group rather than eliminating it, so that imitation appears as travesty, rather than as authentic, as the imitative-ness of the dominant group does to itself. The subordinate group thereby feels inferior if it does not imitate but also inferior if it does imitate, and even non-imitative similarities come to seem imitative. Individuality becomes impossible.

Indicators of Hierarchical Steepness:
Gini coefficient military budget as % GDP income share of minorities
% income shares of % brackets government budget as % GDP representation of minorities
ratio bottom 10% to top 10% police budget as % GDP Gender Development Index
ratio bottom 20% to top 20% incarceration rate Gender Empowerment Index
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% income from interest v.</th>
<th>rate of human rights violation Capability Poverty Index</th>
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<tr>
<td>% income for debt service</td>
<td>military budget v. education, health, HDI, etc. censorship of blasphemy</td>
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<tr>
<td>surplus value extraction rate</td>
<td>Censorship of political news censorship of pornography</td>
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<tr>
<td>unemployment rate</td>
<td>% pop. in military mental hospital incarceration rate</td>
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<tr>
<td>% pop. landless</td>
<td>% pop. Government employment use of honorifics</td>
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<td>% pop. Homeless</td>
<td>% pop. economically dependent expenditure on religion</td>
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<td>% pop. self-employed v. % employed by others</td>
<td>on government authoritarism scale</td>
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<tr>
<td>size of corporations</td>
<td>political freedom indices Thematic Apperception Tests: intolerance of ambiguity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>number of monopolies</td>
<td>ideological censorship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>interest rates</td>
<td>limitations on access to courts Time spent waiting in lines and for appointments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cost v. price ratios</td>
<td>existence &amp; extent conscription Commonness of hereditary work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% homes mortgaged</td>
<td>political freedom index Age grading &amp; rigidity of seniority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% renters v. home owners</td>
<td>commonness of total institutions social distance</td>
</tr>
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<td>broadness of discretionary powers</td>
<td>racism accent &amp; idiom snobbery</td>
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<td>approved cannons of literature</td>
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I) Anticipation of the Next Step in Analysis: Creativity and Power

Creativity is authentic and open. It cannot exist without a direct relationship to openness to experience, which can only exist when some part of an authentic self makes direct contact with some realm of experience unmediated by the accretions of the conventional forms of compensatory, condign, and conditioned power. It has two main modes, concept formation and expression. Concept formation is a new use of thought to elicit features of experience in an identifiable pattern capable of use by others to analyze features of common or transferable experience. Expression is a new use of feeling to combine attitudes toward experience in a way that produces new experience through attitudes toward other experience become subject to change. The study of creativity is the study of culture as evidence of consciousness.

It is sensible to regard creativity, that is, concept formation and expression, as itself something quite different from social power, with which it is often confused, or to imagine that there is such a thing as cultural power separate from other forms of power. It is more accurate to see creativity as something vulnerable to the forms of power, especially conditioned power, and which can only exist by resisting and sometimes repudiating some forms of power.

Creativity nevertheless provides crucial elements of the structured flow of power. Scientific and technological concept formation transform the scope and terms of compensatory power and, increasingly, the scope and terms of condign and conditioned power also. Concept formation can also transform the scope and terms of institutions wielding condign power. And the scope and terms of conditioned power are wholly created by the creativity of culture in both its expressive and concept formation capacities. It is because concept formation and expression have this transformative capacity when others are attracted to or gain conviction in their products that culture is hotly contested, that false claims are readily made about it, that cultural inventors are pressured into the service of power or pressured out of it, and that their concepts and expressions are misunderstood, misrepresented, and misused for purposes of compensatory, condign, and conditioned power of others.

People interested in wielding power can only wield it through conventional forms others respond to. Those skillful in the use of power understand conventions better than those who submit to power, and so may have some unconventional insight into some areas of experience. But whatever creativity they have is quite secondary. The culturally creative face stiff opposition from all three hierarchies of power; hence their work and careers cannot be clearly understood without understanding what they confront, and how and why it is hostile to their work.
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